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Abstract 
 
Trade secret literature does not thoroughly consider information 
asymmetries between companies and employees.  This Article 
visualizes the flows of technical information in and between 
companies and employees and categorizes two types of 
information asymmetries in the information transactions.  The 
information asymmetries cannot be effectively governed by 
contracts and trade secret law.  Companies employ covenants not 
to compete (“CNCs”), non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”), and 
trade secret protection to shift the legal risks borne by employees 
from the disclosure risks borne by the companies, both 
restraining and aggravating the information asymmetries.  The 
contracts and the law cannot increase employee loyalty to 
eliminate the information asymmetries.  The risk shifting is not 
only costly to the companies, but it also harms innovation by 
employees and society due to the inevitable information 
asymmetries.  Moreover, courts are inconsistent in enforcing the 
contracts and trade secret law for promoting innovation and 
other policy reasons.  This Article revisits the literature that 
concerns the balance and the efficiency of the contracts and trade 
secret law for innovation.  It argues that courts reward companies 
for training employees and investing in innovation by enforcing 
trade secrets and CNCs to supplement the ineffective NDAs used 
by companies.  CNCs are less efficient for innovation than trade 
secret law.  Thus, this Article suggests that courts rely on a strong 
trade secret regime when distributing training and innovation 
rewards.  The strong trade secret regime adopts the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine and allows a broad scope of trade secret 
protection, rather than enforcing broad NDAs or CNCs, which 
are less efficient for innovation than trade secret law.  At least, 
this regime should not impair employee loyalty. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Waymo LLC (“Waymo”), Google’s spin-off, repeatedly 
chased after its departing employees who joined its rival—Uber 
Techs., Inc. (“Uber”)—through the arbitration system and the 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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judicial system for trade secret concerns.1  In recent years, the 
most famous and influential disputes in Silicon Valley are the 
disputes between Waymo and Anthony Levandowski—a former 
Google employee, Waymo’s co-founder, and star engineer in self-
driving2—but spun out from Google and sold his spin-out startup 
Otto Trucking LLC (“Otto”) to Uber.3  In Waymo’s legal claim of 
trade secret misappropriation against Uber and Levandowski, 
Waymo alleges that Levandowski downloaded over 14,000 
confidential files from Waymo, which were improperly employed 
by Levandowski, Otto, and Uber.4  Evidence of downloads were 
admitted by the court,5 resulting in a settlement between 
Waymo and Uber to share Uber’s self-driving business.  
However, Waymo continues to pursue rewards from 
Levandowski in arbitration proceedings and for criminal 
penalties against him under criminal trade secret doctrines.6  If 
there is no civil trade secret misappropriation acknowledged by 
the court, how likely is it that a former employee will be 
prosecuted for trade secret theft?  Levandowski had no plan to 
pay the rewards assigned by arbitrators and struggled against 
33 counts of theft and attempted theft of trade secrets,7 but 
recently pleaded guilty to stealing those 14,000 confidential files 
in exchange for federal prosecutors dropping the other 32 
 
1  See Paresh Dave, Waymo Secures Bigger Award Against Workers Who 
Went to Rival Uber, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2020 8:35 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-waymo-uber/waymo-secures-bigger-
award-against-workers-who-went-to-rival-uber-idUSKBN1Z904D (reporting 
that Uber arbitrated against two departing employees who joined Uber other 
than Anthony Levandowski). 
2  See generally Burkhard Bilger, Auto Correct: Has the Self-Driving Car 
at Last Arrived?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 18, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/25/auto-correct (introducing 
the history and background of Google’s self-driving project and the contribution 
made by Levandowski). 
3  See Bernie Woodall, Uber Buys Self-Driving Truck Startup Otto; Teams 
with Volvo, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2016 12:50 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-volvo-otto-idUSKCN10T1TR. 
4  Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73843, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017). 
5  Id. at *41–43. 
6  Associated Press, Ex-Google Engineer Anthony Levandowski Is Charged 
with Trade Secrets Theft, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019 4:02 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-08-27/ex-google-engineer-
anthony-levandowski-is-charged-with-trade-secrets-theft. 
7  Id. 
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counts.8  It is also the hopeless eleventh year that Sergey 
Aleynikov, a former employee of Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), is 
fighting his trade secret theft case, while there has been a civil 
decision exempting him from the civil claim of trade secret 
misappropriation.9  Because of downloading confidential source 
code from Goldman and employing the code at his new employer, 
Aleynikov might have been liable for the civil claim if Goldman 
found the downloading earlier before the expiration of the 
statute of limitations.10 
Besides the confidential information, are there any other 
losses that drive Waymo and Goldman Sachs mad after Waymo 
made a deal with Uber, and Goldman asserted no material 
losses?11  After investing in research and development (“R&D”) 
and training employees, companies face indefinable losses due 
to the departure of employees, which may be definable after a 
long time and uncompensable.12  However, there are talented 
employees like Levandowski and Aleynikov, who are the 
inventors deploying the R&D investment, but are antipathetic 
to being trapped by a company.  They may resign with some 
knowledge when they believe that they do not own any binding 
legal liabilities to the company.13  Can companies investigate 
what the exact knowledge is within the statute of limitations?  If 
they could, should courts assign the companies a full recovery 
 
8  Nick Statt, Self-Driving Car Engineer Anthony Levandowski Pleads 
Guilty to Stealing Google Trade Secrets, THE VERGE (Mar 19, 2020, 8:26 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/19/21187651/anthony-levandowski-pleads-
guilty-google-waymo-uber-trade-secret-theft-lawsuit. 
9  See Peter J. Henning, A Former Goldman Employee’s Long, Strange 
Legal Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/business/dealbook/a-former-goldman-
employees-long-strange-legal-odyssey.html. Jonathan Stempel, Former 
Goldman Programmer Fails, Again, to Toss Theft Conviction, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 
2019 3:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldman-sachs-
aleynikov/former-goldman-programmer-fails-again-to-toss-theft-conviction-
idUSKBN1WN2AR (reporting that Aleynikov has been arrested twice since 
2009 for the trade secret disputes between him and his former employer 
Goldman Sachs). 
10  Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 12-5994, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 155137, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2013). 
11  Id. at *2, 59 (finding that the claims of breach of contract and trade are 
barred for the statute of limitations). 
12  See, e.g., id. 
13  See, e.g., id. at *21–23 (reciting Aleynikov’s claim that he did not sign 
any confidential contracts). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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for the employee departure with the knowledge under contract 
law and trade secret law?  From a legal perspective and a law 
and economics perspective, this Article argues that the answer 
is no to both questions due to inevitable asymmetric information. 
The United States (“U.S.”) constantly strengthens its trade 
secret regime for social demand.14  Technology develops faster 
than the development of law.15  Patent protection by itself is 
never sufficient for protecting technical information.16  Surveys 
show that U.S. companies, especially large companies, view 
trade secrets more important than patents.17  However, it is 
common that companies are like Goldman, taking years to 
ascertain their loss of confidential information.18  After the U.S. 
federal system adopted the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) 
to set up the federal jurisdiction for hearing civil trade secret 
claims in 2016,19 Senator Kamala Harris introduced a bill to 
revise the DTSA in 2019 by increasing the exemplary damages 
and extending the statute of limitations for trade secret 
misappropriations.20  Can the current trade secret regime 
supplemented by such a bill reduce trade secret complaints and 
delight both the innovative companies, such as Waymo and 
 
14  Katherine Linton, The Importance of Trade Secrets: New Directions in 
International Trade Policy Making and Empirical Research, U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMMISSION J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 1, 5–6 (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/katherine_linton_importance
_of_trade_secrets_0.pdf. 
15  David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly 
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1091, 1108 (2012). 
16  E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) 
(discussing ambiguities about the patentable subject matters).  See Bronwyn 
Hall et al., The Choice Between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A 
Review, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 375, 418–19 (2014) (suggesting that trade 
secrets and patents are usually used as complements to each other). 
17  E.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Little Patents and Big Secrets: 
Managing Intellectual Property, 35 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1 n.1 (2004) (discussing 
how larger companies rely more on trade secrets than patents); Vincenzo 
Denicolo & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor 
Defense, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 517, 520 (2004).  But see Josh Lerner, 
Using Litigation to Understand Trade Secrets: A Preliminary Exploration, 
SSRN (Aug. 7, 2006), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=922520. 
18  BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE 
SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 
13–14 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43714.pdf (suggesting that firms 
spend years to realize the loss of trade secrets). 
19  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2016). 
20  S. 1865, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019). 
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Goldman, and innovative employees, such as Levandowski and 
Aleynikov, for promoting innovation? 
The literature, however, is controversial about the 
relationship between the strength of trade secret protection and 
innovation.  Since the 1990’s, legal scholars have seen the 
importance of discussing the efficiency of trade secret law.21  
Trade secret protection may suggest high social costs, including, 
but not limited to, the security costs required by the law and 
independent invention costs for the public.22  However, scholars 
have not thoroughly discussed the efficiency of trade secret 
law.23  Linton suggests that strengthening trade secret 
protection and innovation are positively related at the 
international level.24  Some scholars believe that trade secrets 
promote innovation by reducing employee mobility25 and 
knowledge spillovers to competitors.26  If employees understand 
that they cannot bring the technical information learned from 
companies, they prefer to stay.27  Moreover, Lemley believes that 
trade secret protection is more efficient than private investment 
in precaution against disclosing technical information to 
 
21  See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in 
Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 264 (1998). 
22  See David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 
J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 67 (1991). 
23  See id. (omitting the cost discussion about trade secret law). See also 
Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, 25 
RAND J. ECON. 319 (1994) (failing to prove the efficiency of trade secret law); 
Bone, supra note 21, at 265–69 (criticizing the failure of Lerner and Friedman 
et al. in efficiency study about trade secret law). 
24  Linton, supra note 14, at 11. 
25  See Sharon K. Sandeen & David S. Levine, Trade Secrets and Climate 
Change: Uncovering Secret Solutions to the Problem of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 352, 359 (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., 2016); I.P.L. Png, Trade Secrets, Non-
Competes, and Mobility of Engineers and Scientists: Empirical Evidence, 2–3 
(Aug. 2012), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f749/68d6c888d3648222263e90889f4040f1a8
8b.pdf. 
26  See Tobias Schmidt, An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Patents and 
Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers, CTR. EUR. ECON. RES. 10–11 (2006), 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=69807811608609510708408910
9100080096030023066052042011074117101014072065004022108026016061
0180040290420190671161180740880920470390920280281151020750041230
1801000700700300612307506700601708111308101911600607509402312011
8071023016107073024010127004&EXT=pdf. 
27  See David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade 
Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 768 (2018). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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employees.28  By contrast, Schmidt reminded the importance of 
external knowledge (i.e., knowledge spillovers contributed by 
others) to innovation and company growth.29  Contigiani et al. 
also suggest that employer-friendly trade secret law has adverse 
effects on innovation for undervaluing the innovation efforts 
made by employees.30  Overall, scholars consistently suggest 
that trade secret protection should be balanced.  Trade secrets 
under proper legal protection should promote innovation, 
stimulate clusters, and do not prohibit knowledge access.31  By 
contrast, over-protection of trade secrets eliminates knowledge 
spillovers and reduces clusters.32 
Granting injunctive relief without actual harm under the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine (“IDD”)33 or the DTSA confirms 
the control right of the fruits of R&D investment.  However, 
lavishing injunctions conveys over-rewarded first-mover 
advantages.34  In order to provide proper and balanced trade 
secret protection, courts have to decide the expiration of trade 
secrets because there is no legislative expiration date for trade 
secrets, while companies prefer trade secrets to patents for the 
perpetual protection of trade secrets.35  The expiration of trade 
secrets implies terminating the first-mover advantages of trade 
secret owners and the spillover benefits of the public.36  The 
difficulty for courts originates from their power to assign the 
benefits. 
 
28  Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as 
IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 334–35 (2008). 
29  Schmidt, supra note 26. 
30  Andrea Contigiani et al., Trade Secrets and Innovation: Evidence from 
the “Inevitable Disclosure” Doctrine, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2921, 2924 (2018). 
31  See id. at 2922 (suggesting that trade secret protection needs to be 
balanced for promoting innovation); Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Ronde, High-
Tech Clusters, Technology Spillovers, and Trade Secret Laws, 22 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 45, 45 (2004); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade 
Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 623, 633–34 (2013); Sandeen & Levine, supra note 25, 
at 352. 
32  Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 45. 
33  See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
34  See infra Sections V.B, V.C. 
35  See Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, Patents vs. Trade Secrets: 
Knowledge Licensing and Spillover, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 1112, 1116 (2006); 
Schwartz, supra note 31, at 647. 
36  Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 811 (emphasizing the 
importance of first-mover benefits given by trade secret protection to 
companies). 
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Based on the U.S. trade secret law, this Article explores the 
efficiency and the balance of enforcing trade secret protection by 
courts in civil cases for promoting innovation.  The contribution 
of this Article is that it traces and maps the process of technical 
information formation and the information transactions 
between companies and employees.  Employees can be either the 
originators of valuable technical information or the agents of 
deploying the information in business, or both.37  Accordingly, 
this Article highlights two types of inevitable information 
asymmetries: first, employees may self-teach some technical 
information held by the company; second, employees may not 
disclose the innovative technical information originated by them 
to the company.38  The two types of information asymmetries 
result in moral-hazard problems and suggests increased 
probable deadweight losses to companies after investing in 
R&D. 
In order to explore the balance of governing technical 
information disclosure, this Article focuses on three primary 
trade secret protection measures against technical information 
disclosure by employees: (1) covenants of not to compete 
(“CNCs”); (2) non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”); and (3) the 
trade secret legal doctrines under the Uniform Trade Secret Act 
(“UTSA”)39 and the DTSA.  NDAs, or confidentiality agreements, 
prohibit employees from unauthorized disclosure of the 
employer’s confidential information.40  CNCs regulate that 
employees shall not compete with the employer “in the 
employer’s existing or contemplated businesses for a designated 
period of time (e.g., three to five years) in a specified 
geographical region that corresponds to the market in which the 
employer participates” after the termination of employment.41  
However, all of those legal measures have uncertainties and 
shortcomings to eliminate the information asymmetries, 
 
37  See infra Part II. 
38  See infra Section II.C. 
39  UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
40  See Miles J. Feldman, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable 
Information: Trade Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 BERKLEY 
TECH. L. J. 151, 179 (1994). Stuart J. H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do 
Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1063, 1082 (2008). 
41  Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology 
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 602–03 (1999). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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resulting in inefficiency in promoting innovation.  Thus, this 
Article revisits the literature concerning the efficiency and the 
inefficiency of the contracts and trade secret law under the track 
of the information flows between companies and employees, and 
explores the balance of enforcing them for courts. 
This Article argues that CNCs and trade secret law are 
conditional rewards for companies to supplement NDAs.  
Instead of lavishly enforcing NDAs, a more efficient combination 
for innovation is to narrowly enforce NDAs but broadly recognize 
trade secrets.  While both CNCs and the IDD under trade secret 
law can restrict employee mobility, they are not equivalent.42  
The rewards given by enforcing CNCs are cheaper but less 
efficient than trade secret law (including the IDD) in terms of 
encouraging innovation.43  Contracts and trade secret law 
convert the disclosure risks borne by companies to legal risks 
borne by employees.44  This Article suggests that under the 
fiduciary duties imposed by contracts or law, employee loyalty is 
still important but cannot be effectively increased by the 
discussed legal measures.45  The risk-shifting by legal security 
measures may place innovation conducted by employees 
opposite to R&D invested by companies.46  Courts should not 
send signals to disregard employee loyalty in civil cases, 
regardless of whether courts can improve employee ethics and 
prevent trade secret thefts by enforcing criminal doctrines.47 
Part II maps the information transactions between a 
company and its employees, and visualizes the two types of 
information asymmetries in the transactions.  Part III 
introduces how contracts (i.e., CNCs and NDAs) and trade secret 
law govern the technical information disclosure by employees.  
Part IV analyzes the risks of the disclosure under legal security 
measures, the ineffectiveness of the legal security measures 
which exaggerates the risks, and innovation impacted by the 
risks.  Part V discusses the efficiency of enforcing the contracts 
and trade secret law on innovation. 
 
 
42  See infra Section V.B. 
43  See infra Sections V.B, V.C. 
44  See infra Section IV.D 
45  See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C, IV.D, V.D. 
46  See infra Section IV.D. 
47  See infra Section V.D. 
9
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II. Internal Technical Information Transactions 
 
Innovation, R&D, production, and marketing need to 
exchange and use technical information.  Figure 1 depicts a 
decision tree, which shows how a unit of technical information is 
deployed by companies and employees after the information is 
independently created and held by either side of them.  Both a 
company and employees can control the technical information 
produced by the company’s investment, depending on who is the 
direct creator of the information.48  When holding control, the 
company and employee inventors have the choice to disclose the 
information to each other or outsiders.  Phase I knowledge 
transactions from companies to employees constitute employee 
training, exchanging for Phase II knowledge transactions from 
employees to employers.  On the one hand, the strength of the 
control dynamically varies between the company and employees 
in the internal knowledge transactions.  On the other hand, 
continuous R&D also happens in the transactions of information 
between companies and employees. 
In Figure 1, “root” is the root of the decision tree is a unit of 
creative technical information (T).  “Target nodes,” represented 
by the circle nodes at the end of each path of the decision tree, 
describe the possible existing forms of the creative technical 
information from the perspective of the employer.  When the 
company controls the information, it can become a part of a 
patent (P1), be placed in the public domain (D), or be treated as 
a trade secret and be used in the current/1st-generation product 
or producing process (P2), in the second generation product or 
producing process (P3), to send signals to competitors, 
consumers, or investors (P4), or with no specific goals (P5).  When 
an employee inventor controls the information, the information 
can be transferred to the company and achieve the above targets 
or be remained with the employee as information asymmetries.  
The employee can retain control of the information in the form 
of deadweight loss (L) or transfer the information to others.  The 
employer’s direct competitors can use the information as the 
company’s homogeneous product (H1).  The company’s non-direct 
competitors can use the information as the company’s 
 
48  See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 389 (2006) 
(discussing the allocation of control rights of shares between outsiders and 
insiders). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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heterogeneous product (H2).  Finally, “decision nodes,” 
represented by the rectangles in Figure 1, represent 
uncertainties to be explored by the company and decisions to be 
made by the company or the employee inventor.  When the 
company and the employee explore legal uncertainties or make 
transaction decisions, there are costs posted.  The costs vary 
with T, the company’s intellectual property (IP) management, 
the employment contracts, and the employee’s education, 
knowledge, experience, and skills. 
11
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Figure 1. Technical Information Transactions Between the Company and 
Employee Inventors.49 
 
49  The logic of this theoretical figure is originated by the author and 
expressed in a serious of studies.  This figure focuses on the flow of information 
transactions and is another expression of the information accessibility by the 
public, which is expressed in Figure 1 in Runhua Wang, Information 
Asymmetry and the Inefficiency of Informal IP Strategies Within Employment 
Relationships 15 (May 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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A. Phase I Knowledge Transactions: from Companies to Employees 
 
The internal transactions of technical information from companies 
to employees who do not create the information are a process of training. 
Companies have the incentives to disclose the technical information to 
these employees to use in production or marketing or further develop the 
information in R&D.50  In internal transactions, the information control 
held by companies is not stable, depending on the information’s existing 
forms.  If a company holds the information, and the information exists in 
a patent or in the public domain, the company has absolute control of the 
information.51  When employees can access or learn the information that 
is not publicly available, the company has relative control over the 
information because of the risks of unauthorized information leakage by 
employees.52  The company considers disclosure risks in its translations of 
technical information with its employees. 
 
1. Public Information 
 
Companies have control over the public technical information 
only when the information is under patent protection.53  Filing patent 
applications is the primary way that an information holder discloses its 
technical information.54  A reasonable information holder maximizes his 
income received from the information.55  Thus, the information holder is 
hardly able to disclose its information for free.56  Patent law allows patent 
holders to be compensated from the market and provides patent holders at 
least first-mover advantages.57  When patent applications are rejected, or 
patents have expired, the technical information embedded in the patent 
 
50  See Lemley, supra note 28 at 332. 
51  See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2020). 
52  See Png, supra note 25, at 1–3. 
53  See 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
54  See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 359-363 (2003). 
55  ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12–13 (6th ed. 
2012). 
56  See Bhattacharya & Guriew, supra note 35, at 1115 (suggesting the 
nature of knowledge in business is to sell the knowledge).  But see Schmidt, 
supra note 26 (suggesting the benefits of a marketing stunt after open 
innovation). 
57  See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 755. 
13
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applications or patents drops in the public domain passively.58  The 
information holder then loses its control of the information. 
Companies do not prohibit, but rather encourage, internal 
transactions of their technical information if the information is under 
patent protection.59  Employees need to use the information when 
conducting their work, which gives companies incentives to reduce the 
learning costs of the information for employees.  Moreover, it is a common 
strategy for companies to protect their technical information against 
employees by filing patent applications.60  Regardless if outsiders learn 
the information through employees, the company that is a patent holder 
can protect the information by suing for patent infringement.61 
Patents, however, are a limited exiting form of much technical 
information.  First, the technical information should be qualified as 
patentable subject matter; it must be within the scope of “process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”62  However, besides this 
fundamental barrier, the scope of patent protection is not clear.63  Second, 
patents are expensive in application, maintenance, and litigation.64  If a 
patent cannot bring enough revenue or investment to offset the costs of 
patent application and maintenance, small businesses hesitate to file patent 
applications but prefer trade secrets to patents.65  Third, companies do not 
 
58  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 122, 371. 
59  See Lemley, supra note 28. 
60  April M. Franco & Matthew F. Mitchell, Covenants Not to Compete, 
Labor Mobility, and Industry Dynamics, 17 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 581, 
603 (2008). 
61  35 U.S.C. § 271. 
62  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).  The European Patent Office (“EPO”) does not 
provide patent protection for discoveries; scientific theories; mathematical 
methods; aesthetic creations; schemes; rules and methods for performing 
mental acts; playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; 
and presentations of information if patent applications do not have other 
technical features.  See The European Patent Convention, art. 52, June 2016, 
Eur. Patent Conv.  See also 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 & 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (defining mathematical 
concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes 
as “abstract ideas,” which are hardly subjective to patent eligibility). 
63  See Lerner, supra note 17, at 7.  See generally Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (blurring the boundaries of patentable subject 
matters by vague language in the court decision).  
64  See Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclosure in 
Patent Law, 21 RAND J. ECON. 131 (1990).  See also Douglas C. Lippoldt & 
Mark F. Schultz, Uncovering Trade Secrets - An Empirical Assessment of 
Economic Implications of Protection for Undisclosed Data 9 (OECD Trade 
Policy Papers No. 167, 2014); Almeling, supra note 15, at 1116; Lerner, supra 
note 17, at 5. 
65  See Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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use patents to protect valuable inventions for not disclosing the 
inventions.66  Most advanced technologies are protected under trade 
secrets.67  Moreover, survey data suggest that companies use trade secrets 
more often than patents.68 
 
2. Unpublished Technical Information 
 
When the technical information held by a company is not publicly 
available, the company treats it as trade secrets.69  The company can 
affirmatively use the technical information in its first-generation products, 
the production of the first-generation products (P2), or the development of 
the second-generation products (P3).  Alternatively, the technical 
information can be deployed as negative trade secrets, advertised as 
business tricks (P4), or deposited as a secret per se (P5) by the employer.70  
Even though negative trade secrets are not activated by the information 
holder in its products or production, business tricks deter competitors or 
 
for Appropriation, 30 RES. POL’Y 611, 613 (2001); Nishant Dass et al., 
Intellectual Property Protection and Financial Markets: Patenting vs. Secrecy 4 
(May 19, 2015), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/clbe/events/innovation/documents/DassNandaXiao.pdf; Levine & 
Sichelman, supra note 27, at 763–64; Lemley, supra note 28, at 331.  But see 
Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J. L. & ECON. 563 
(1995); Lerner, supra note 17, at 4; Anton & Yao, supra note 17, at 3 (arguing 
that small innovations should be all protected under patents). 
66  See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1117, 1142. 
67  Sandeen & Levine, supra note 25, at 352–53. 
68  See John Kitching & Robert Blackburn, Intellectual Property 
Management in the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), 5 J. SMALL BUS. & 
ENTERPRISE DEV. 327, 329–32 (1998) (showing British SMEs prefer trade 
secrets to patents by survey data); Linton, supra note 14, at 6.  See, e.g., Trade, 
Investment, & Industrial Policies in India: Effects on the U.S. Economy, Inv. 
No. 332-543, USITC Pub. 4501, at *140 (Dec. 2014) (showing that trade secrets 
are more important to US “internationally-engaged” companies than patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks by survey data); Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High 
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley 
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1310 (finding that one-third of 
people do not file patent applications for preventing technology disclosure). 
69  See Lippoldt & Schultz, supra note 64, at 6 (categorizing three types of 
trade secrets, including technical information, confidential business 
information, and know-how).  Know-how is considered as a type of technical 
information in this research.  Id. 
70  See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1115 (suggesting no 
incentives for companies to disclose their knowledge for free).  See also Michael 
A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A Plan for 
Proactive Strategy, 43 BUS. LAW. 887, 887–88 (May 1988) (categorizing trade 
secrets as trade secrets used in business, trade secrets providing a competitive 
advantage, or trade secrets as secrets per se). 
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suggest values to competitors or alliances.71  By contrast, the deposited 
secrets per se sleep and do not suggest any imminent economic value.72  
Overall, keeping the technical information in secret may maximize the net 
present value of the technical information.73 
The transaction of unpublished technical information from 
companies to employees who do not create the information is a process of 
training regardless of whether this process has the value of R&D, 
production, or marketing.  Employees cannot learn technical information 
that is a trade secret unless the company trains them.  On the one hand, 
employees have incentives to learn the knowledge and reduce the training 
costs for companies.74  On the other hand, the training costs are not zero 
due to the costs of opaque information and increase as the company 
increases the opacity and keeps the information secret.75 
The concerns about spillovers of unpublished technical 
information prevent companies from training employees with unpublished 
technical information.  After employees have access to technical 
information, knowledge spillovers are reducible but inevitable due to the 
difficulties and high costs in keeping knowledge in secrets.76  Employee 
mobility and employee-involved external communications may trigger 
knowledge spillovers.77  Spillovers create potential competitors78 and are 
losses to companies.79  Survey data show that departing employees are 
 
71  See Dass et al., supra note 65, at 22 (criticizing the inefficient 
information asymmetry resulted from trade secrets). 
72  See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 1, 22, 32 (2007) (suggesting that secret information itself as 
secrecy has value). 
73  See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 664 (reasoning from the perpetuity of 
trade secrets and corporations). 
74  See Png, supra note 25, at 20 (suggesting that employees make 
tradeoffs between low wages and training in their early-career stages). 
75  See Dass et al., supra note 65, at 1 (suggesting the costs of opacity and 
the costs of trade secrets). 
76  See Schmidt, supra note 26, at 6. 
77  See Png, supra note 25, at 1–3 (suggesting less employee mobility 
equals fewer knowledge spillovers between employers). 
78  See Paavo Ritala et al., Knowledge Sharing, Knowledge Leaking and 
Relative Innovation Performance: An Empirical Study, 35 TECHNOVATION 22, 
24 (2015) (“[Knowledge leakage]. . .creates new competitors for the original 
knowledge owner.”).  See also C. Christopher Baughn et al., Protecting 
Intellectual Capital in International Alliances, 32 J. WORLD BUS. 103, 104 
(1997) (“Uncontrolled information disclosure . . . possibly help[s] to create a 
future competitor.”). 
79  See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1115 (suggesting 
spillovers are against trade secrets and business principles of maximizing 
profits). 
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“the biggest threat of loss” to British companies.80  Therefore, training or 
information disclosure to employees increases the risks of spillovers and 
opportunity costs.81  As a result, employers may overinvest in secrecy and 
block their unpublished technical information from their employees.82 
 
B. Phase II Knowledge Transactions: from Employees to 
Companies 
 
Besides being a receiver of knowledge trained by a company, an 
employee is also a creator of knowledge and technical information.  
Regardless of the controversial question of who owns the technical 
information produced by an employee during employment,83 the employee 
has the absolute control of the technical information before its disclosure 
to the company.84  Strategically, the employee can either transfer the 
technical information to the company or outsiders, or not disclose it at all, 
which is a deadweight loss to society (L). 
If the technical information can be exchanged for value, a 
reasonable employee should have incentives to transfer it to his employer 
or outsiders (i.e., another employer or a start-up), rather than keep it as a 
deadweight loss (i.e., L).  Employees expect internal and external career 
advancement by being innovative and producing valuable technical 
information.85  After an employee has disclosed the technical information 
 
80  See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 780; Kitching & Blackburn, 
supra note 68, at 329. 
81  See Gilson, supra note 41, at 601 (“[T]he earlier in the invention process 
an employee must make the decision to undertake a start-up, the riskier is the 
employee’s human capital investment in the venture.”). 
82  See Lemley, supra note 28, at 334 (discussing overinvestment in 
secrecy by companies without trade secret law).  See also Friedman et al., supra 
note 22, at 68 (balancing the public and private costs of precautions against 
theft of trade secrets). 
83  See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689).  
Locke’s labor theory suggests that laborers own the property rights of what 
they produce and should be able to control the fruits of their labor.  See id.  IP 
scholars criticize this theory and believe that IP law is utilitarian and 
preempts the personal interests of the laborers.  See Wendy J. Gordon, A 
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533, 1540, 1608 (1993); Bone, 
supra note 21, at 283–88. 
84  See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: 
Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190, 
191 (1994) (suggesting that only inventors know the value of their inventions).  
Even though technical information is more than an idea, it is not practical for 
employers to monitor and react to every word that employees write on 
notebooks or save on computers. 
85  See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2938 (stating “[career 
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to his employer, there are litigation risks (e.g., trade secret 
misappropriations) if the employee transfers the technical information to 
others.  Therefore, in theory, an employee should have stronger incentives 
to transfer the technical information to his employer rather than to 
outsiders. 
Employees, however, have limited incentives to transfer the 
technical information produced by them to their employers.  Employees 
make tradeoffs between learning or receiving economic and reputational 
payments from companies.86  They learn from companies in the early 
career stage and accept low payments as the investment to the learning.87  
After learning in Phase I transactions, they look for better payments for 
their knowledge or the technical information produced by them from 
companies or outsiders.88  Companies can incentivize employees to 
transfer knowledge to companies by increasing the compensation 
employees receive.89  However, companies may not increase the 
compensation because of the investment in training the employees in 
Phase I transactions.90  As a result, employees have few incentives to 
produce valuable technological information when they encounter both low 
payments and few external opportunities.91 
It is problematic that many companies do not realize the 
importance of Phase II transactions of technical information from 
employees to employers.92  Large companies with a big pool of knowledge 
do not rely on the knowledge contributed by particular employees.93  
 
advancement] . . . may depend on both internal-to-the firm and external career 
paths”). 
86  See Png, supra note 25, at 19. 
87  See Jarle Moen, Is Mobility of Technical Personnel a Source of R&D 
Spillovers?, 23 J. LAB. ECON. 1, 2 (2000) (showing “the youngest workers appear 
to invest most heavily in on-the-job learning” by empirical evidence). 
88  Id. at 20.  See also Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 47–48 (suggesting 
that high-value information and high wage offered from externalities increase 
mobility).  
89  See Png, supra note 25, at 20 (“By reducing such outside opportunities, 
trade secrets law might force employers to increase compensation.”). 
90  See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted M. Sichelman, Revisiting Labor 
Mobility in Innovation Markets 3 (Univ. S. Cal. L. Sch. Legal Studies Research 
Papers Series, Paper No. 207, 2016), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df2e/ca68c18dfcde41c754697de86e00f1f822c7
.pdf (showing that low wages are paid to employees for the training costs of 
employers). 
91  See Png, supra note 25, at 19–20 (suggesting that employees invest 
them less if they would have fewer external opportunities). 
92  See id. at 19 (arguing that companies do not understand the 
importance of human capital investment on their R&D). 
93  See id. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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Small companies may not be able to produce valuable R&D.94  However, 
a company itself does not produce any technical information, which is all 
transferred from its employees.95  The technical information transferred 
from employees to companies reflects the innovation efforts produced by 
the employees, which are expected by companies. 
 
C. Problems of Information Asymmetries 
 
Information asymmetries always exist in Phase I and Phase II 
information transactions between companies and employees.96  First, 
when a company controls a unit of technical information and trains its 
employees with the information, the company is incapable of knowing 
how much the employees actually learn.97  Second, the company is 
incapable of knowing how valuable the information originated from 
employees will be.98  When information is originated from employee 
inventors, the company is passive to access that information.99 
The first type of information asymmetries result in direct losses or 
deadweight losses to the company if the employee inventor discloses the 
information to others without authorization from the company.  The 
unauthorized information disclosure results in a direct loss when others 
use the information and produces products or services competing with the 
company’s first and second-generation products or services.  The 
disclosure results in deadweight losses to the company if others profit from 
the information in other ways. 
The second type of information asymmetries is deadweight losses 
to the company.  If the employee inventor does not disclose the 
information to outsiders (i.e., L), the information is treated as a deadweight 
loss to society.  If the information could be valuable to the company and 
 
94  See id. at 20. 
95  See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1116 (suggesting that 
knowledge buyers do not produce ideas). 
96  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 308 (1976) (stating information asymmetry exists in agency relationships, 
which are contracts “under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision -making authority to the agent.”). 
97  See Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 583. 
98  See Png, supra note 25, at 9 (suggesting that employers can never 
understand the value of the inventions of employees the same way the 
employees do). 
99  See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 666 (suggesting that the nature of 
secret information is information asymmetry in the transactions between the 
information holder and its investors). 
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protected under patents P1100 or used in the company’s first/second-
generation products or producing the products (i.e., P2 or P3), the adverse-
selection problem arises.  Alternatively, the employee inventor may 
transfer the information to outsiders, such as a spin-out startup,101 new 
employers, or other companies.  Homogenous products H1 and 
heterogeneous products H2 produced by using the information result in a 
loss to the company because it could be profited from the products (i.e., 
H1 and H2).  Between the two types of loss, the loss of the technical 
information producing homogenous products H1 is larger due to the harm 
on the company’s current market share.  The lost profits caused by 
transferring the technical information to outsiders suggest a moral-hazard 
problem resulting from information asymmetries.102 
With respect to this moral-hazard problem, employees have both 
abilities and motivations to transfer their creative technical information to 
outsiders,103 even though employers expect loyalty from employees.104  A 
piece of technical information resulting from an employee’s intelligence 
has an unbalanced value to the employee inventor and his employer.  First, 
the employee values the technical information produced by him higher 
than the company.105  Second, the information can be undervalued by the 
 
100  Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 585 (arguing that there are 
companies that file patent applications to protect information and prevent 
information disclosure by employees). 
101  Spin-out startups are formed by employees based on their own 
decisions; employees form spin-off startups as a choice of employers.  See id. at 
582. 
102  See generally Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Moral Hazard and 
Renegotiation in Agency Contracts, 58 ECONOMETRICA J. ECON. SOC’Y 1279 
(1990). 
103  See Manuel Trajtenberg & Roy Shalem, Software Patents, Inventors 
and Mobility, SSRN 101, 145 (2009), 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=45402609800412108401810910
6090015093000085002012023032095093074109069087095002119006057018
1220391071090120911071200220290680780250940360370130931000720970
7210400506701204608306700907112712108612402809511509800711200400
4016027004112119102096006086084&EXT=pdf (suggesting that asymmetric 
information is the main incentive for job mobility of inventors); YEH, supra note 
18, at 15 (listing the motivations of trade secret thefts, which include personal 
financial gain). 
104  Lemley, supra note 28, at 335. 
105  An information holder values its information higher than the buyers 
of the information.  In the training story, an employer is the information holder 
and values their training more than the contributions and efforts done by its 
employees.  In the information asymmetry story, an employee values his or her 
intelligence higher than how much the employer compensates him or her for 
producing the technical information.  See Risch, supra note 72, at 35 
(suggesting that people overvalue what they produce or own). 
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company before information disclosure.106  Because of the costs of 
training employees, the company pays relatively lower compensation to 
employees compared to the value that the employees contribute to the 
company.107  Third, employees can be compensated more from outsiders 
than the company.108  The value of the technical information received from 
employees also depends on how the company manipulates and deploys the 
information in business.109 
The moral-hazard problem can also result in the problem of 
reverse selection.110  When the negotiation power of employees is weak 
against the company, employees are less likely to disclose and transfer the 
technical information produced by them on the employment position to 
the company.111  During their employment, they may not transfer the 
information to outsiders; the information is treated as a deadweight loss to 
the society (i.e., L).112  After their mobility, they may use the information 
with a new employer or a spin-out startup, exposing the moral-hazard 
problems.113 
 
III. Trade Secret Protection Governed by Contracts and Trade 
Secret Law 
 
The primary measures of trade secret protection include physical 
restrictions, contracts, and trade secret law.  The literature suggests that 
trade secret protection enables companies to disclose knowledge and 
secret technologies to employees.114  Physical security measures are costly 
and prohibit technical information disclosure from companies to 
 
106  See Png, supra note 25, at 9. 
107  See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90, at 3. 
108  See Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35, at 1113 (suggesting the 
value of knowledge spillovers to innovation). 
109  See Lemley, supra note 28, at 336 (arguing that secret information can 
be developed to have a higher value by externalities under Arrow’s Paradox). 
110  See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Adverse Selection 
and Renegotiation in Procurement, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 597, 597 (1990). 
111  Anton & Yao, supra note 84, at 192 (arguing that the inventor’s weak 
negotiation power results in non-disclosure of his or her invention or spin-out 
startups). 
112  See Lemley, supra note 28, at 335–36. 
113  See YEH, supra note 18, at 14. 
114  See generally Lemley, supra note 28, at 319–20. 
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employees.115  By contrast, the other two approaches of trade secret 
protection reduce the social costs of information disclosure.116 
The primary civil law dealing with trade secret misappropriations 
is contract law (e.g., the law about enforcing CNCs and NDAs), the 
Restatement (First) of Torts, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, and trade secret law (i.e., the UTSA, the DTSA, and relevant 
common law doctrines).117  In general, scholars agree that trade secret 
protection under trade secret law can spur R&D.118  Empirical evidence 
supports that the enactment of the UTSA and strong enforcement of trade 
secret law are positively related to R&D investment by large businesses, 
especially in high-tech industries.119  This Part introduces the trade secret 
statutory law and the common law supplementing the statutes in trade 
secret protection and discusses their uncertainties. 
 
A. Employment Contracts 
 
There are mainly two types of employment contracts governing 
the security of technical information.  One type is CNCs, and the other 
type is NDAs.  Both types of contracts can prevent knowledge spillovers 
caused by employee mobility.  Before the beginning of developing trade 
secret-specific law in common law in the late-nineteenth century, 
companies and courts relied only on these two types of agreements to 
protect trade secrets.120  These agreements are still used by companies to 
 
115  See Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 897–98 (listing common 
“affirmative steps” to keep information secret, such as locking gates, using 
security orders to distinguish employees, marking employees by asking them 
to wear security badges). 
116  See Lemley, supra note 28, at 335; Lippoldt & Schultz, supra note 64, 
at 7–8 (suggesting that trade secret protection increases R&D investment). 
117  See Almeling, supra note 15, at 1106 (suggesting that even though 
trade secret law varies by states and the federal level, the UTSA is a template 
for the various trade secret laws).  But see 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2016); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–59 (Am. Law Inst. 1939); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (Am. Law Inst. 1995); Christopher 
Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
427, 428 (1995) (arguing that trade secrets should be subject to property law, 
rather than tort law); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 54, at 355 (arguing that 
trade secret law is not independent of the liabilities under contract law and 
tort law). 
118  Lemley, supra note 28, at 326. 
119  See generally I.P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence from State 
Trade Secrets Laws, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167 (2017). 
120  See Bone, supra note 21, at 251–52 (citing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 
Mass. 452 (Mass. 1868)) (highlighting Peabody v. Norfolk as the starting point 
of having trade secret common law). 
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secure technical information and complement or supplement the 
protection under trade secret law.  CNCs are employee-based, and NDAs 
are information-based to restrict employee mobility and secure technical 
information transactions within a company.  These two types of contracts 
are primarily governed by common law but are also governed by state 
statutes.121 
 
1. Covenants Not to Compete 
 
CNCs encourage Phase I transactions of technical information 
from companies to employees.122  Employee mobility is the primary 
reason for knowledge spillovers.123  Even though CNCs may not directly 
address confidential information, employers can use CNCs to retain 
valued employees and reduce employee mobility.124  Furthermore, CNCs 
can reduce the risks of spillovers and prevent the losses and opportunity 
costs resulting from information transfers from employees to outsiders.125  
By preventing spin-outs, CNCs are used to prevent competition by 
startups. 
Courts allow the enforcement of CNCs restrictively under two 
elements: (1) the necessity of enforcing the CNC; and (2) the 
reasonableness of the restraints in the CNC.126  The enforcement of CNCs 
should be necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of 
employers,127 which specifically refer to trade secrets, confidential 
information, and goodwill.128  With respect to the reasonableness, courts 
usually consider the restrictions on time and geographical scope in 
CNCs.129  For example, Texas courts require consideration for 
 
121  Png, supra note 25, at 8. 
122  See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90, at 3 (suggesting that CNCs 
promote training employees by employers). 
123  Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 890. 
124  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 276 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2000) (“The [trial] court also stated that the non-competition covenant 
was ‘not being used to protect confidential information, but it is used as a 
measure to retain valued employees.’”). 
125  Gilson, supra note 41, at 602–03. 
126  See, e.g., Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 576–77 
(Mass. 2004). 
127  Id. at 576–77 (“A covenant not to compete is enforceable only if it is 
necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time 
and space, and consonant with the public interest.”). 
128  See Marine Contractors Co. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Mass. 
1974). 
129  E.g., Boulanger, 815 N.E. at 576–77. 
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establishing reasonableness130; New York courts weigh the losses of 
employers against the restraints on employees, which should not be higher 
than the former131; and Georgia law adds that CNCs are only restricted to 
“key employees.”132  As a typical example, an enforceable CNC in 
Wisconsin is as follows: 
 
Upon termination of this Agreement, [employee] shall not 
participate in any way, directly or indirectly, either 
through direct or indirect ownership, employment or 
otherwise, in any business which deals with or relates to 
products or services which are the same or similar to those 
manufactured and/or sold by [employer] in the field of fine 
chemistry, pharmaceuticals and electronic components, 
for a period of one year in the American continents and 
Japan.  In addition, [employee] shall cease all contacts 
with any existing or prospective customers of [employer] 
as well as with its suppliers, provided that [employee] 
may maintain such contacts in the pursuit of business not 
competing, whether directly or indirectly, with that of 
[employer].133 
 
While the above examples show that CNCs are unlikely to be 
unconditionally enforceable, CNCs are not consistently enforceable in the 
U.S., either.  PBC News Hour reports that about 40% of Americans have 
signed CNCs, but only about 20% of the CNCs are binding.134  Some states 
that have “anti-CNC” statutes to govern unfair competition and the 
freedom of employment disfavor or constrict the use of CNCs,135 such as 
 
130  See generally Powerhouse Prods. v. Scott, 260 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. App. 
2008). 
131  See BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg,712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999) (“A 
restraint is reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the 
protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue 
hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.”). 
132  GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-50 (West 2011). 
133  La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 526 (1996). 
134  Kristen Doerer, What You Should Know About Noncompete 
Agreements, PBS (July 14, 2016 6:11 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/know-non-compete-agreements. 
135  Noncompete Reform Continues in New England: Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Rhode Island All Pass New Laws, FISHER PHILLIPS: NON-
COMPETE & TRADE SECRETS BLOG (July 17, 2019), 
https://www.fisherphillips.com/Non-Compete-and-Trade-Secrets/noncompete-
reform-continues-in-new-england-maine (reporting that Massachusetts, 
Maine, New Hampshire, and Rohde Island recently passed laws to prohibit 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/5
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California,136 Illinois,137 and Oregon.138  It does not mean that CNCs are 
strictly voided in these states,139 but rather less likely enforceable.  By 
contrast, some states have “pro-CNC” statutes that authorize the use of 
CNCs, such as Massachusetts,140 Michigan,141 North Carolina,142 and 
Texas.143  However, these statutes set restrictions in drafting CNCs144 or 
do not guarantee the enforceability of CNCs in courts.145  Moreover, 
despite the statutes that protect employers in Michigan, Michigan state 
courts disfavor CNCs.146  In other states (e.g., New York) without statutes 
to void CNCs, the courts may still reject CNCs for the considerations of 
public policies.147 
 
2. Non-Disclosure Agreements 
 
enforcing CNCs against low-wage employees).  See also Barnett & Sichelman, 
supra note 90, at 3 (“[S]everal state legislatures have enacted laws or are 
considering enacting laws to prohibit or restrict noncompetes.”). 
136  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE. §16600 (West 2020) (“Except as 
provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void.”); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (West 2016); Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen Inc., 
Civ. No. 2:17-00715, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13548, at *12–13 (Jan 25, 2018) 
(prohibiting non-compete agreements for unfair competition under antitrust 
law). 
137  See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/10 (2017). 
138  See OR. REV. STAT § 653.295 (2019). 
139  See, e.g., Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 289–90 (Cal. 
2008) (permitting CNCs as exceptions of §16600 if reasonableness is 
established).  See also Gilson, supra note 41, at 607–09 (noting that there could 
be cases allowing CNCs in California, even though CNCs are commonly not 
applicable in California). 
140  MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149 § 24L (2018). 
141  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (West 1985). 
142  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4 (West 2005). 
143  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2009). 
144  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.149, § 24L (West 2018).  The 
statutes in Massachusetts establish minimum standards for valid and 
enforceable CNCs. 
145  For example, Massachusetts courts do not consistently enforce CNCs.  
See Gilson, supra note 41, at 603–07 (discussing the inconsistent application 
of CNCs in Massachusetts, where the courts favor CNCs in general). 
146  See, e.g., Huron Tech. Corp. v. Sparling, No. 316133, 2014 Mich. App. 
LEXIS 1675, at *6 (Mich. App. Sep. 11, 2014) (rejecting enforcement of the 
CNC because it is unreasonably broad). 
147  See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Schmertzler, 500 
N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“[A] covenant given by an employee 
that he will not compete with his employer has been regarded much more 
strictly because of the powerful considerations of public policy which militate 
against sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood . . . .”). 
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In addition to CNCs, NDAs are another common measure to 
prevent and deter employees from disclosing confidential information to 
outsiders.148  In employment relationships, NDAs—or confidentiality 
agreements—establish confidential responsibilities.  Today, employment 
contracts usually include confidential provisions.149  In other words, 
NDAs are usually signed at the beginning of establishing employment 
relationships.  As a result, if the research is conducted during the 
employment, research results are confidential under NDAs regardless of 
when a research idea is generated. 
Similar to CNCs on prohibiting employee mobility, NDAs are 
also a double-edged sword in innovation.  On the one hand, NDAs crush 
startup competitors and deter competitors from hiring their employees or 
acquiring their confidential information.150  On the other hand, NDAs 
deter companies from hiring talented employees from their competitors.151 
Compared to CNCs, NDAs are more closely related to trade secret 
law.  The foundation of trade secret protection in trade secret law is the 
privacy or confidentiality of trade secrets.152  Holmes suggested that if a 
company cannot contain its technical information secret, trade secret law 
does not prohibit employees from revealing the information to others.153  
Samuelson followed Holmes and suggested that the nature of trade secret 
law is about “breach of confidence or use of improper means to obtain a 
trade secret.”154 
NDAs, however, do not necessarily create enforceable trade 
secrets.155  First, NDAs may not be binding if the confidential information 
 
148  Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 905. 
149  Orly Lobel, Symposium Keynote: The DTSA and the New Secrecy 
Ecology, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 369, 377 (2017). 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
152  See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 
1012, 1014–17 (5th Cir. 1970) (excluding a concern of breach of confidence for 
policy reasons, such as promoting innovation).  See also Bone, supra note 21, 
at 297. 
153  E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102–
03 (1917). 
154  Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and 
Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 365, 374–75 (1989). 
155  See Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a 
Contract: Examining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect 
Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 124 (2005) (“A trade secret cannot be created by 
contract.”). 
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does not constitute a trade secret.156  If NDAs are not clear about what 
information is confidential, employers still lose their cases claiming 
breaches of confidentiality.157  Scholars constantly criticize that NDAs 
could be interpreted too narrowly to get enforced and protect companies 
when courts only rely on common law.158  Moreover, there are 
uncertainties that courts enforce or reject NDAs for policy reasons.159  The 
policy reasons include, but are not limited to, promoting innovation and 
creation, reducing precaution costs, protecting privacy, and enforcing 
“standards of commercial ethics.”160  The failures of enforcing NDAs 
could constitute “security lapses,” which result in failures to enforce trade 
secrets.161 
In addition to NDAs, labor law and human capital law may 
function similarly to NDAs by strengthening the control of companies 
over the innovative contributions made by employees.  Under the 
California Labor Code, employers can claim property rights on whatever 
employees produce in their employment due to the resources of the 
employers.162  In American Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, the court ruled that 
trade secrets and confidential information, including the knowledge of 
employees obtained in these measures, are properties owned by 
employers.163  Employees can use other information only after the 
termination of employment.164  Companies do not hold property rights 
 
156  See id. at 143 (“Where information is not a trade secret but constitutes 
confidential or proprietary information, it is argued that a party who 
contractually agrees to maintain the confidentiality of such information is 
bound to honor the contract.”). 
157  Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 905. 
158  Risch, supra note 72, at 41. 
159   See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable 
Information, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 683, 689–90 (1980) (“Courts will accept these 
[confidentiality] agreements as evidence that the firm valued the information 
and attempted to preserve its secrecy, but they decide for themselves whether 
the information should actually be protected.”). 
160  See Bone, supra note 21, at 297.  See also E. I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 431 F.2d at 1016–17; Judge Richard Posner, Note, Trade Secret 
Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment Analogy, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 470–71 (1992). 
161  Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 898. 
162  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (West 1988) (“Everything which an employee 
acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to 
him from his employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired lawfully or 
unlawfully, or during or after the expiration of the term of his employment.”). 
163  Am. Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, 308 P.2d 494, 496–97 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1957). 
164  Id. 
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over the technical information165 produced by employees but acquire 
property rights when the information constitutes trade secrets, which are 
kept in confidential and exclusive use.166  Moreover, based on Bd. of Trs. 
of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys.,167 scholars 
like Lobel believe that employment relationships suggest a default and 
constant transfer of title of inventions from employees to employers.168 
 
B. Trade Secret Law 
 
The standard of trade secret protection widely accepted by most 
states originated from common law169 and was formally added in the 
Restatement (First) of Torts in 1939.170  This standard is substantially 
identical to the definition of trade secrets and the rules in the UTSA,171 
which the Uniform Law Commission sketched as statutory law in 1979.172  
In practice, empirical evidence showed that state courts often cite the 
 
165  See Risch, supra note 72, at 14.  See also E. I. Du Pont de Nemours 
Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). 
166  See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19, 25–27 (1987). 
167  563 U.S. 776, 779 (2011) (holding that employers are assignees and 
owners of patents produced by using the sources of employers). 
168  See Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and 
the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 815 (2015) (“The 
‘automatic assignment’ adopted by the Supreme Court has meant that an 
employment or assignment agreement signed at the beginning of employment 
automatically transfers title to the employer, with no further act of transfer 
required once those inventions are conceived and come into existence.”). 
169  See Brittany S. Bruns, Criticism of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 
2016: Failure to Preempt, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 469, 473 (2017).  See also 
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 425 (Mass. 1868); Bone, supra note 21, at 251–
59 (introducing how people and courts solve trade secret issues under property-
based theory before the formation of the concept of trade secret and a separate 
trade secret law).  Bone argues that trade secret protection discussed in 
Schiller’s Article and the Roman Law is very different from today’s trade secret 
law, so we do not trace the history of trade secret law to the Roman Law.  But 
see A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi 
Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930), in A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, AN AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE IN ROMAN LAW 1 (1971) (discussing the trade secret protection 
under the Roman Law). 
170  See Victoria A. Cundiff, Maximum Security: How to Prevent Departing 
Employees from Putting Your Trade Secrets to Work for Your Competitors, 8 
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 301, 304 (1992). 
171  See id. at 305 (introducing the definition of a trade secret in the UTSA, 
which is similar to the Restatement (Frist) of Torts).  See generally Roman A. 
Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277 (1980). 
172  See Bruns, supra note 169, at 475. 
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UTSA but rarely cite Restatement (First) of Torts in trade secret 
disputes.173 
All of the states, excluding North Carolina and New York, have 
voluntarily enacted the UTSA as of January 2020 to address trade secret 
protection,174 rather than merely apply common law.175  Even though the 
Uniform Law Commission does not list North Carolina as a state enacting 
the UTSA,176 its trade secret law is close to the UTSA.177  The trade secret 
law in New York also moves towards the UTSA.178 
At the federal level, the DTSA enables civil claims for trade secret 
misappropriations to be a federal question of law since 2016.179  It 
substantively aligns with the UTSA.180  Therefore, trade secret law in this 
Article refers to how state courts and federal courts apply the UTSA, the 
DTSA, and relevant case law dealing with trade secret protection.181 
In theory, scholars suggest that trade secret law is an efficient 
substitute for contractual and physical restrictions in trade secret 
protection.182  First, trade secret law is consistent with tort theories to deter 
 
173  David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 61 (2011) (“Only 5% of the cases 
[between 1995–2009] cited the Restatement (First) of Torts.”). 
174  See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985), 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited 
May 14, 2020). 
175  See Almeling et al., supra note 173, at 76 (showing that most states 
that used common law were the states had not adopted the UTSA). 
176  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985), 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited 
May 14, 2020). 
177  See SBUBHA GHOSH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 10 (3rd ed., 
2016). 
178  Two bills were introduced in 2019 and proposed to adopt the UTSA.  
See H.R. 1657, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 2468, 116th Cong. (2019). 
179  See Linton, supra note 14, at 8 (“The DTSA creates a federal civil cause 
of action for trade secret misappropriation.”).  Before the DTSA, only criminal 
claims for trade secret espionage qualified as a federal question under the 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA).  Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104–294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996). 
180  See Joseph P. Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2019).  See also Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. 
Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 829, 865–66 (2017); Lobel, supra note 149, at 380–81. 
181  This Article does not address unfair competition legislation with 
respect to trade secret protection in the context of employment relationships. 
182  See Lemley, supra note 28, at 313. 
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wrongful acts conducted by employees.183  Second, trade secret law avoids 
overinvestment in secret protection by companies.184  Third, it is also 
inefficient to frequently sue for CNCs or NDAs.185  When courts hesitate 
to enforce contractual restrictions on employees, scholars suggest that 
companies should rely on trade secret law.186  Moreover, applying 
common law to trade secret issues has a deficiency that courts do 
recognize the value of trade secrets, which is the secrecy itself.187 
Under trade secret law, the primary test for bringing a civil claim 
of pursuing trade secret protection requires that a plaintiff establishes: (1) 
the existence of a trade secret; and (2) a misappropriation of the trade 
secret.188  These two elements summarize the common rules in the 
Restatement (First) of Torts,189 the UTSA,190 and the DTSA.191  In a broad 
sense, these three laws provide consistent definitions of trade secrets and 
misappropriations.192  However, the two elements are applied with 
variations and uncertainties by state courts and federal courts when they 
apply the UTSA and the DTSA.193 
In order to establish the first element, a trade secret should be 
novel, have independent economic value, and be maintained secretly with 
reasonable efforts.194  With respect to the standard of independent 
 
183  Id. at 319. 
184  Id. at 334–35. 
185  See Gilson, supra note 41, at 609. 
186  See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 767 (“[T]rade secrets and 
patents can be used to mimic the preclusive effects of noncompetition 
agreements by creating significant penalties for bringing proprietary 
information to a new employer.”); Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90, at 9 (“A 
firm may use patents to protect against knowledge leakage through employee 
movement.”). 
187  See Risch, supra note 72, at 38, 41 (arguing that common law fails to 
create liabilities in all cases). 
188  See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 126–27. 
189  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–59 (Am. Law Inst. 1939). 
190  UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
191  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2016). 
192  See generally Bruns, supra note 169 (discussing the uniformity and 
inconsistency of the DTSA and how states adopt the UTSA with variations). 
193  See generally id. 
194  18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2016). 
 
[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of 
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
engineering information, including patterns, plans, 
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, 
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and 
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economic value, Johnson summarized five tests adopted by courts, 
uniformly suggesting that a trade secret has “transferable and objective 
positive value.”195  With respect to novelty or the scope of trade secret 
protection, the UTSA and DTSA definition of a trade secret excludes the 
information “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” to others.196  
Nevertheless, this definition is still broad.197  It could protect information 
that is not in continuous commercial use as trade secrets.198  When states 
enact the UTSA, the definition of a trade secret may be further broadened.  
For example, the California UTSA (CUTSA) definition of a trade secret is 
broader than the UTSA,199 as the CUTSA excludes the “readily 
ascertainable” restriction.200 
 
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, 
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing 
if . . . the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to 
keep such information secret; and . . . the information derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
through proper means by, another person who can obtain 
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information. 
 
Id.  See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, 
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
process, that . . . derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being 
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who 
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and . . . 
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
 
Id.  See also Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1996). 
195  Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REv. 545, 
547 (2010). 
196  See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2016); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
197  See Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA Preemption and 
the Public Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State 
Law Claims Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 97–101 
(2012); Bruns, supra note 169, at 481–82 (arguing that the DTSA definition of 
a trade secret is close to the UTSA definition of a trade secret). 
198  See Johnson, supra note 195, at 563. 
199  Bruns, supra note 169, at 478–79. 
200  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2012).  See also Abba Rubber Co. v. 
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“[W]hether a fact is 
‘readily ascertainable’ is not part of the definition of a trade secret in 
California.”). 
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In high-technology industries, however, the scope of an applicable 
trade secret may be relatively narrow.201  Courts may dismiss a trade secret 
case for the plaintiff’s failure to identify the alleged trade secret under 
either the UTSA or the DTSA, regardless of which claim is raised by the 
plaintiff.202  Moreover, “pre-conception inventions” are excluded from 
being entitled to trade secret protection.203  Trade secret law is hardly 
enforced against intangible spillovers.204  Besides high-technology 
industries, there are also “odd cases” applying a narrow definition of trade 
secrets.205  For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied 
trade secret protection for literary works based on lack of novelty and non-
obviousness,206 which are the requirements for patent protection.207 
Moreover, in the employment context, courts may define trade 
secrets narrowly for public policies.208  The Restatement (First) of Torts 
states that “[m]atters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an 
industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret.”209  Courts and 
scholars also uniformly agree that general skills, education, abilities, and 
experience of employees, probably trained by employers, are not trade 
secrets.210  The uncertainty of the boundary of this exclusion is that courts 
do not clearly understand what constitutes the unprotectable “general 
knowledge, skill, and experience” (“KSE”), resulting in inconsistent 
decisions.211 
 
201  Camilla A. Hrdy, The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience 
Paradox, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2409, 2466–71 (2019) (citing cases decided in 
California, Florida, and New York in which courts applied a “particularity” 
requirement and rejected to apply broad trade secret protection against 
employees). 
202  See, e.g., Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 
3d 915, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Illinois UTSA to reject the plaintiff’s DTSA 
claim); Lobel, supra note 168, at 810–11 (discussing same). 
203  See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1266 (3rd Cir. 
1985). 
204  See Gilson, supra note 41, at 578. 
205  Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Secrets in the United States and Japan: A 
Comparison and Prognosis, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 68, 102 n. 140 (1989). 
206  See Walker v. Univ. Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(supporting the district court that denied trade secret protection due to the 
“both vague and obvious” information). 
207  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03. 
208  See generally Hrdy, supra note 201. 
209  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
210  See generally Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: 
Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 
29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 841 (1998) (trying to draw a boundary between 
“unprotectable ‘general skill and knowledge’” and “protectable ‘trade secrets’”). 
211  See generally Hrdy, supra note 201. 
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Therefore, legal professions constantly recommend the use of 
NDAs to companies in information disclosure.212  Signing NDAs 
explicitly establishes the knowledge about the existence of trade secrets.213  
NDAs are referenced by federal courts to determine whether companies 
adopt reasonable measures of trade secret protection.214  However, 
confidential information does not necessarily qualify as enforceable trade 
secrets.215  NDAs are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for 
showing the existence of trade secrets.216  Moreover, NDAs aggravate 
rather than eliminate the uncertainties about whether a duty of 
confidentiality is breached.217 
With respect to the second element, in short, misappropriations 
refer to the disclosure or the use of the trade secrets that are acquired by 
improper means without consent from their holders.218  Courts need only 
 
212  See, e.g., Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 904–05; Cundiff, supra note 
170, at 309. 
213  See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). 
214  David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 (2010). 
215  Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 107 (Me. 2001) (affirming 
a breach of contract but denying trade secret misappropriation because the 
information lacks economic value).  Risch cited this case to distinguish common 
law from trade secret law.  See Risch, supra note 72, at 38. 
216  See Risch, supra note 72, at 38.; Sandeen, supra note 155, at 140 
(“[W]hile a confidentiality agreement is some evidence of reasonable efforts, it 
is not determinative of the issue); Johnson, supra note 195, at 566 (“A trade 
secret is not a heap of confidential information.”). 
217  See Bone, supra note 21, at 276–77 (arguing that trade secret law 
leads thieves to invest in concealing, which increases the investigation costs of 
trade secret owners). 
218  UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 
“Misappropriation” means: (i) acquisition of a trade secret of 
another by a person who knows or has reason to know that 
the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (ii) 
disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express 
or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means 
to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of 
disclosure or use knew or had reason to know that his 
knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through 
a person who has utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) 
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or 
through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief 
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a 
material change of his position, knew or had reason to know 
that it was a trade secret ad that knowledge of it had been 
acquired by accident or mistake. 
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to check the second element when plaintiffs show that there is a valid trade 
secret.  “Improper means” include, but are not limited to, criminal and 
tortious behaviors,219 such as breaches of an obligation of 
confidentiality.220  “Improper means” can be established against 
employees who derive the information through the employers if they own 
the obligation, even though the employees acquire technical information 
by employers’ voluntarily training.221  The obligation of confidentiality 
can be either explicit in a contract or implicit by duty.222  However, this 
obligation can be waived under public policies, such as fair competition 
and the freedom of employee mobility.223  Moreover, the second element 
is restrictively applicable when courts recognize a piece of information as 
a valid and enforceable trade secret.224 
Some states allow companies to tackle a “threatened 
misappropriation” under the IDD,225 which is embedded in the UTSA.  
The UTSA broadly indicates that “[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation 
may be enjoined.”226  The DTSA also adopts this rationale completely.227  
 
 
Id. 
219  Besides the listed criminal and tortious behaviors in the UTSA and 
the DTSA, a behavior that is “not itself a crime, a tort, or a breach of contract” 
may constitute an improper means.  See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 180, 
at 908.  See also E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 
(5th Cir. 1970). 
220  UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B)(III) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1985). 
221  UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
222  See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). 
  
[T]he Supreme Court of Pennsylvania painted, in broad 
strokes, the general picture of a claim of this nature, holding 
the essential elements to be: (1) existence of a trade secret, 
(2) communicated to the defendant (3) while he is in a 
position of trust and confidence and (4) use by the defendant 
to the injury of the plaintiff.  This, then, is our broad basis for 
decision. 
 
Id.  See also Lemley, supra note 28, at 318 (listing obligations of protecting 
trade secrets which can be explicit by contracts or implicit by duty). 
223  See Hrdy, supra note 201, at 2413 n.27. 
224  See generally id. at 2433–34 (discussing the scope of trade secret 
protection). 
225  Randall E. Kahnke et al., Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure, FAEGRE & 
BENSON 1 (Sept. 2008), 
https://www.faegrebd.com/webfiles/Inevitable%20Disclosure.pdf. 
226  UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
227  18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (West 2016). 
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An “inevitable disclosure” refers to “the threat that an employer’s trade 
secrets will be misappropriated during the course of the employee’s 
subsequent employment.”228  Therefore, without actual harms, courts may 
still grant injunctions against threatened harms or to restrict employee 
mobility by applying the IDD.229 
The IDD’s application in trade secret protection, however, is 
controversial and often connected with the controversially-applied 
CNCs.230  The IDD’s application is affected by public policies with respect 
to employee mobility and the freedom of employment.231  The most 
influential case in which the court adopted the IDD is PepsiCo v. 
Redmond.232  After this case, “[t]wenty-one American jurisdictions have 
recognized the [IDD].”233  Even though some states adopt the IDD, the 
IDD is restrictedly applied by courts, such as in Missouri234 and New 
Jersey.235  Moreover, the IDD is inconsistently applied in some states, such 
as Florida, Indiana, and Illinois.236  Appendix lists the adoption of the IDD 
and its consistency with CNCs and the IDD by states in detail, suggesting 
controversies across and within states. 
 
IV. Risks of Disclosing Technical Information in Employment 
Relationships 
 
Companies have marginal costs of information disclosure 
resulting from employee mobility or betrayal.  The literature about 
 
228  Ryan M. Wiesner, A State-By-State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: 
A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 211, 228 (2012). 
229  See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 46 F.3d 29 (7th Cir. 1995). 
230  M. Claire Flowers, Facing the Inevitable: The Inevitable Disclosure 
Doctrine and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2207, 2217 (Fall 2018). 
231  Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee 
Mobility v. Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HiGH TECH. L. 161, 167 (2004). 
232  See Redmond, 46 F.3d at *29. 
233  Allot Commc’ns., Ltd. v. Cullen, No. 10-E-0016, 2010 N.H. Super. 
LEXIS 11, at *7 (N.H. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2010). 
234  See H & R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 
1074 (W.D. Mo. 2000). 
235  There is an inconsistency in between the application of IDDs by the 
3rd Circuit and New Jersey state courts.  Compare Cont’l Group, Inc. v. Amoco 
Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356 (3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting threatened 
misappropriation), with Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 
530 A.2d 31, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (protecting threatened 
misappropriation). 
236  Wiesner, supra note 228, at 219–21. 
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employee turnover discusses the value of employees and their knowledge 
as assets.237  There is some technical information accessible to both 
employees and the public, such as “general [KSE],”238 the disclosure of 
which does not increase the loss to the company holding the information.  
However, when an employee leaves or betrays, the company loses this 
employee as human capital and some technical information only held by 
the employee.  Meanwhile, employee mobility or betrayal may also result 
in probable losses for disclosing some unpublished technical information 
held by the company but accessible to the employee. 
In conducting innovation and transmitting technical information 
between the company and employees, the company bears disclosure risks, 
and employees bear legal risks if information disclosure triggers legal 
restrictions.  The two types of risks and the probability of disclosing the 
unpublished technical information can be reduced by physical or legal 
restrictions placed by the company on employees.  This Part explains the 
risks and the company’s probable losses due to employee mobility or 
betrayal and information disclosure, which can be reduced or prevented 
by legal protection. 
 
A. Allocation of Disclosure Risks 
 
Figure 2 maps different legal or physical measures of securing 
technical information in two axes.  A company’s disclosure risks are 
depicted by the Y-axis.  The X-axis depicts a departing, betrayal, or 
reckless employee’s legal risks of disclosing the technical information 
received, produced, or potentially produced in the company.  The 
employee has low legal risks if there are no enforceable legal restrictions 
against information disclosure.  By contrast, the company has high 
disclosure risks if it expects to exclusively use unpublished technical 
information.  However, there may be no enforceable legal restrictions 
against the disclosure of the information. 
 
237  Urbancová Hana & Linhartová Lucie, Staff Turnover as a Possible 
Threat to Knowledge Loss, 3 J. COMPETITIVENESS 84, 84 (2011). 
238  See generally Hrdy, supra note 201. 
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Figure 2. Risks Allocation by Legal Security Measures.239 
 
In three circumstances, the company bears low disclosure risks.  
First, the company may deny the employee access to unpublished technical 
information by physical measures.  Thus, the employee cannot disclose 
the information that he has not learned.  Second, the company may 
voluntarily reveal the information to the public as patents (i.e., P1) or in 
the public domain (i.e., D).  Correspondingly, the employee does not bear 
legal liabilities for the information disclosure.  Third, the company may 
have strong legal protection for the information, such as enforceable 
NDAs, CNCs, or trade secrets under the UTSA, the DTSA, or the IDD.  In 
such a situation, the employee bears high legal risks for information 
disclosure caused by him for his legal duties. 
Broad trade secret law, such as the CUTSA and the IDD, reduces 
disclosure risks borne by the company compared to average trade secret 
law.240  The CUTSA enables trade secret protection for confidential 
 
239 Wang, supra note 49. 
240  See Risch, supra note 72, at 54 (suggesting that trade secret protection 
in California is stronger than other states and reduces litigation costs and 
litigation uncertainties). 
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information readily ascertainable to the public.241  Moreover, compared to 
the UTSA that may enjoin threatened misappropriations,242 the IDD and 
the DTSA enjoin departing employees from threatened misappropriations, 
broader than the UTSA’s fundamental protection scope.243  By contrast, 
some courts that narrowly adopt the UTSA enjoin actual 
misappropriations, as shown in Appendix.  In such a circumstance, the 
difficulties in enforcing a trade secret increase disclosure risks borne by 
the company. 
In contrast to the circumstances of imposing low disclosure risks 
to the company, it bears high disclosure risks without any legal protection 
or under ineffective legal protection.  The company can establish fiduciary 
duties against information disclosure by using CNCs, NDAs, or other 
security measures.  However, the fiduciary duties may not be properly or 
effectively established. 
The company bears high disclosure risks if it reveals information 
to the employee but releases him from any fiduciary duties.  First, it is 
apparent that the employee does not bear any legal risks if the employee 
does not own fiduciary duties to the company.  Thus, when the employee 
self-teaches the information without direct authorization of information 
accessibility given by the company, the company fails to impose explicit 
fiduciary duties on the employee.  Second, CNCs and NDAs that are 
signed by the employee but are ineffective and not enforceable do not 
impose fiduciary duties successfully.  Some states commonly do not 
enforce CNCs for legislative restrictions (e.g., California).244  In such a 
circumstance, the employee bears low legal risks for the information 
disclosure solely governed by the unenforceable CNCs because the 
employee knows that the signed CNC is very likely to be void.  Some 
states set strict thresholds for enforcing CNCs, such as time length and 
geographical scope.245  Similarly, courts may refuse to enforce NDAs for 
policy reasons,246 which results in high uncertainties about enforcing the 
 
241  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2012); Abba Rubber Co. v. 
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
242  18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (2016); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
243  Kahnke et al., supra note 225, at 2. 
244  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE. § 16600 (Deering 1941); CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 2802 (Deering 1937). 
245  E.g., Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 576–77 
(Mass. 2004) (“A covenant not to compete is enforceable only if it is necessary 
to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time and space, 
and consonant with the public interest.”). 
246  See Kitch, supra note 159, at 689–90.  See also discussion supra 
Section II.A. 
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signed NDAs and high disclosure risks.  For instance, non-trade secret 
confidential information addressed by NDAs may not be enforceable in 
courts.247  If the NDAs are void, the employee, again, bears low legal risks 
for the invalidity of the NDAs.  Moreover, the company may not sign 
adequate NDAs to effectively cover each unit of technical information that 
the company is not ready to reveal to the public.248  Therefore, the 
confidential information other than trade secrets imposes high risks borne 
by the company and the employee.  On the one hand, the confidential 
information imposes fiduciary duties on the employee, suggesting high 
legal risks if he reveals the information.  On the other hand, the scope of 
trade secrets is narrower than confidential information.  The company may 
believe that it holds “trade secrets,” which merely constitute confidential 
information rather than enforceable trade secrets under trade secret law 
(e.g., P3, P4, and P5).  As a result, the company may lose the exclusive 
rights over the information if courts refuse to protect the information under 
trade secret law. 
 
B. Ineffectiveness of Legal Protection for Unpublished Technical 
Information 
 
The restrictions and uncertainties of the legal security measures 
for prohibiting information disclosure suggest four reasons explaining that 
the legal security measures cannot effectively protect unpublished 
technical information.  First, some types of secrets may not be enforceable 
against employees under CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret law.  The 
contracts and trade secret law have various uncertain boundaries 
depending on the technical information’s function and significance in 
business.  Second, courts may refuse to enforce secrets for policy reasons.  
Third, some employees may process Phase I transactions of unpublished 
information without the company’s knowledge, which may be outside of 
the legal protection under contract law and trade secret law.  Fourth, the 
company may not know the existence of some knowledge only held by its 
employees and cannot enforce its legal rights under contract law or trade 
secret law.  These four theoretical arguments about the ineffective legal 
protection have been proved by Schmidt’s empirical evidence: knowledge 
spillovers are inevitable regardless of trade secret protection.249 
 
247  See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 143 (“Where information is not a trade 
secret but constitutes confidential or proprietary information, it is argued that 
a party who contractually agrees to maintain the confidentiality of such 
information is bound to honor the contract.”). 
248  See Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 898. 
249  See generally Schmidt, supra note 26. 
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Figure 3. Risks Allocation by Information Types.250 
 
First, CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret law can conceal the 
unpublished technical information deployed by a company in its first-
generation products or production (i.e., P2).  CNCs are confined to the 
protection against the company’s competitors (i.e., P2 – P5, L, H1, H2).  By 
contrast, other types of unpublished technical information (i.e., the 
technical information for developing the second-generation products P3, 
deterring competitors P4, or being deposited P5) may not be enforceable 
under trade secret law due to their hardship to establish the existence of 
enforceable trade secrets.  Trade secret law does not impose liabilities on 
employees for all types of secrets.  Moreover, CNCs cannot perfectly 
conceal them, either, because these types of information can be more 
attractive to non-competitors than competitors.  In addition, NDAs 
governing these types of information in confidential may not be 
enforceable if there is a threshold of showing trade secrets for courts to 
 
250 Wang, supra note 49. 
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enforce the NDAs.  NDAs are neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for establishing enforceable trade secrets.251 
Second, courts give policy reasons to decline to enforce NDAs, 
CNCs, and secrets.252  Knowledge spillovers are a public good, which can 
be caused by information disclosure or employee mobility.253  Thus, courts 
may refuse to enforce fiduciary duties imposed in NDAs or under trade 
secret law for knowledge spillovers and to promote social innovation.  
Moreover, courts may decline to apply the IDD or enforce CNCs for the 
same reason or the freedom of employment.254  By contrast, courts may 
also enforce NDAs, CNCs, and secrets for other policy reasons, including 
but not limited to promoting innovation and creation, reducing precaution 
costs, protecting privacy, and enforcing “standards of commercial 
ethics”.255  Taking NDAs as an example, Lobel suggests that NDAs are a 
double-edged sword in innovation.256  On the one hand, NDAs crush 
startup competitors and deter competitors from hiring employees of a 
company or acquiring its confidential information.257  On the other hand, 
NDAs deter the company from hiring talented employees from their 
competitors.258  Overall, the uncertain policy reasons adopted by courts 
may result in either ineffective or effective legal protection for all types of 
unpublished technical information. 
Third, contract law and trade secret law may not be effective to 
protect unpublished technical information for information asymmetries, 
which are discussed in Part II.  Franco and Mitchell suggested that a 
company is incapable in knowing how much employees exactly learn the 
unpublished technical information held by the company.259  Other scholars 
also broadly recognize the existence of information asymmetries.260  Even 
though adequate NDAs may cover all the confidential information against 
the employees who access the information with authorization, NDAs 
cannot effectively impose fiduciary duties on the employees who self-
 
251  See Risch, supra note 72, at 6–8; Sandeen, supra note 155, at 125; 
Johnson, supra note 195, at 551. 
252  See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Schmertzler, 166 
A.D.2d 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).  See also Kitch, supra note 159, at 697. 
253  Pace, supra note 117, at 441–42. 
254  Godfrey, supra note 231, at 167. 
255  Bone, supra note 21, at 250; Kitch, supra note 159, at 685. 
256  Lobel, supra note 149, at 370. 
257  Id. at 377. 
258  Id. 
259  Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 603. 
260  E.g., Png, supra note 25; Schwartz, supra note 31; Dass et al., supra 
note 65, at 4 (suggesting that small firms suffer the information asymmetries 
the most). 
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teach the information without authorization.  As a result, the company does 
not have an enforceable NDA against the self-taught employees and may 
lose the trade-secret information against any outsiders.  Regardless of 
whether or not there are enforceable CNCs and the unpublished technical 
information is used by a direct competitor, knowledge spillovers created 
by the employees at least result in deadweight losses for the company. 
Fourth, NDAs, CNCs, or trade secret law is incapable of imposing 
fiduciary duties on employees for the asymmetric information only held 
by employees (i.e., L, H1, and H2).  The company hardly knows the 
information held only by employees (i.e., L, H1, H2)261 and to estimate the 
information value.262  The employee inventor has the absolute control of 
the technical information before the information is disclosed to the 
company.263  Thus, the company is incapable of retrieving the information 
unknown to it.  Yeh argues that it usually takes a long time for companies 
to realize that their trade secrets are misappropriated by (departing) 
employees, which creates difficulties for companies to enforce trade secret 
protection.264  However, companies suffer insuperable hardships for the 
asymmetric information only held by employees.  On the one hand, most 
startups file patents to avoid trade secret litigations, suggested by the 
empirical evidence of Shalem and Trajtenberg.265  On the other hand, 
NDAs and trade secret law cannot be precautions against such a situation 
for the failure of imposing fiduciary duties when companies do not control 
the information.  Even though courts recognize the property rights of 
companies over the technical information developed by their R&D 
investment, the companies should not pursue the rights under contract law 
and trade secret law.266  Moreover, CNCs restricting employee mobility 
prevent the information from being disclosed to competitors, but cannot 
restrict departing employees from disclosing the information to others or 
force the employees to transfer the information back to the company. 
The company may be entitled to the property rights of the 
asymmetric information under labor law, human capital law,267 or patent 
 
261  See Schwartz, supra note 31. 
262  See Png, supra note 25. 
263  See generally Anton & Yao, supra note 17. 
264  See YEH, supra note 18, at 13–14. 
265  See Trajtenberg & Shalem, supra note 103, at 129. 
266  See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., 563 U.S. 776, 792 (2011); Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 
1276, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Anton & Yao, supra note 17; Lobel, supra note 
149. 
267  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (2019) (“Everything which an employee 
acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to 
him from his employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired lawfully or 
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law, especially after the modern utilitarian law prevails Locke’s labor 
theory that laborers own the property rights of what they produce, rather 
than contract law or trade secret law.268  Thus, disclosing such asymmetric 
information may increase legal risks associated with labor law or human 
capital law rather than legal risks associated with contract law or trade 
secret law.  This increase is limited because employees can always argue 
that the information is in the public domain (i.e., D).  The startups funded 
by departing employees (spin-outs) always file patents to prevent trade 
secret legal issues raised by their previous employer.269  This consequence 
of filing patents with the asymmetric information held by them increases 
disclosure risks borne by the previous employer. 
 
C. Reduced Innovation Without Contracts and Trade Secret Law 
 
The high risks of disclosing technical information by employees 
borne by a company increase the company’s security costs in innovation 
and deter its innovation.  There are three ways to reduce the disclosure 
risks without increasing the legal risks borne by employees.  First, the 
company can disregard CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret law to reduce the 
disclosure risks.  The cheapest way to reduce the disclosure risks is to 
voluntarily reveal the information to the public for free.  Then, the KSE of 
employees are broadened for the open access to the information.  
Moreover, the information then is contributed to the public domain (i.e., 
D) and spur social innovation as knowledge spillovers, regardless of 
employee mobility.  However, there is no control for the company if the 
information is contributed to the public domain.270  The company may 
suffer the loss of developing the information and do not sustain innovation. 
A company hardly disclose its information to the public for free, 
but it may generate more revenue for exclusively holding the information 
(i.e., storing the information as P1 to P5).271  A reasonable information 
holder maximizes its income received from the information.272  Legal 
professions reminded that many industries profit from IP rights, rather than 
 
unlawfully, or during or after the expiration of the term of his employment.”).  
See also Am. Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, 308 P.2d 494, 497 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1957). 
268  See generally LOCKE, supra note 83. 
269  See Anton & Yao, supra note 84, at 192, 203 (reasoning as a result of 
weak negotiation power owned by employees). 
270  See Hall et al., supra note 16, at 376. 
271  See generally Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35.  But see Schmidt, 
supra note 26, at 7 (suggesting a marketing stunt for open innovation). 
272  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 55, at 12–13. 
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merely products.273  Thus, to reduce disclosure risks, companies will 
persist in securing the technical information in secrecy (i.e., P2  to P5) 
against both the public and employees or under patents (i.e., P1) for 
maintaining the exclusive rights.  Both of the options are expensive, which 
is supported by the literature introducing the efficiency of trade secret 
law.274 
Securing the information from employees, however, harms 
innovation, which is opposed to the goal of trade secret law.275  When 
reducing the disclosure risks, the company refuses to train employees in 
KSE and strictly forbids employees from accessing the unpublished 
technical information.  The worst case is that the unused information (i.e., 
P3 to P5) does not generate imminent value and drops in deadweight losses 
to both the company and the society.  Therefore, scholars desire 
developing trade secret law for increasing the training.276  However, the 
literature stops at where employees can receive few additional KSE in such 
a situation.  The harm of strictly blocking information from employees 
also includes limited innovation activities conducted by employees, low 
innovation incentives of employees, and low employee stability and 
loyalty.  Employees can learn or acquire the unpublished information (i.e., 
P2 to P5) by self-teaching, suggesting a failure of reducing the disclosure 
risks. 
 
D. Reduced Innovation Under Contracts and Trade Secret Law 
 
A company can reduce its disclosure risks by relying on legal 
security measures other than patent law, such as CNCs, NDAs, and trade 
secret law.  The legal security measures impose fiduciary duties on 
employees, which increases legal risks borne by them.  Shifting the 
company’s disclosure risks to employees as legal risks is only effective 
under a precondition that the contracts (i.e., CNCs and NDAs) or trade 
secrets should be enforceable under the law.  Otherwise, the legal risks 
increase without a decrease in the disclosure risks.  For example, even 
though the company believes that it has trade secrets, the “trade secrets” 
 
273  See Almeling, supra note 15, at 1104. 
274  Filing patent applications is costly, and the information may not be 
patentable.  Moreover, the information’s R&D costs and patenting costs may 
not be fully compensated by the 20-year patent protection.  See e.g., Friedman 
et al., supra note 22, at 65; Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 755–70 
(listing eight reasons for using trade secrets to substitute for patents); Lemley, 
supra note 28, at 339–41.  But see Bone, supra note 21, at 269, 271–77. 
275  See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974) 
(encouraging companies to share information with employees). 
276  E.g., Lemley, supra note 28.  But see Bone, supra note 21, at 271. 
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may probably not enforceable when lacking: (1) a narrow scope; (2) 
economic value; (3) novelty; or (4) actual misappropriations.277 
The increased legal risks borne by employees for reducing the 
disclosure costs harm both the company’s innovation and social 
innovation.  Superficially, the high legal risks for fiduciary duties deter 
employees from mobility, betrayal, or revealing confidential information 
in other forms.  Employees are prohibited from using the arguable 
technical information (i.e., P2 to P5) after the employment or disclosing the 
information to outsiders.  Accordingly, the literature suggests that assured 
exclusive rights induce large businesses to invest in R&D under the 
sacrifice of entrepreneurship and innovation conducted by startups.278 
As a result of the strong exclusive rights for the company 
imposing strong fiduciary duties, however, employees may not have 
incentives to learn or acquire the information from the company.  
Moreover, under the high legal risks for information disclosure, 
employees also have few incentives to transfer the information to the 
employers if they are the controllers of the information (i.e., L, H1, and 
H2), reducing Phase II transactions.  The increased legal risks borne by 
employees reduce the disclosure risks borne by the company by squeezing 
the size of unpublished information (i.e., accumulated P2 to P5) learned, 
used, or contributed by employees. 
By contrast, employees have motivations to transfer their creative 
technical information to outsiders279 and hide it from the company, even 
though the company expects their loyalty.280  Employees have 
expectations on their internal and external career path.281  However, their 
intelligence and the technical information produced by their intelligence 
have unbalanced values to the employees and the company.  First, 
information producers—employees value the technical information more 
than the information receivers—the company.282  Second, the company 
may undervalue the information.283  On the one hand, the value of the 
technical information depends on how the company manipulates and 
deploys the information in its business.284  On the other hand, because of 
the costs associated with training employees, the company pays relatively 
 
277  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
278  See Lobel, supra note 149, at 377 (arguing that DTSA that strengthens 
trade secret protection has large harm effects on small firms). 
279  See generally Trajtenberg & Shalem, supra note 103. 
280  See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 28, at 335. 
281  See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2938. 
282  Risch, supra note 72. 
283  Png, supra note 25. 
284  Lemley, supra note 28. 
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lower wages to employees compared to their contribution to the 
company.285  Third, outsiders may pay more to employees for the technical 
information than the company or be more efficient to deploy or further 
develop the information, which may drive employee mobility.286  
Therefore, it is groundless to suggest that restricting information mobility 
by trade secret law can promote the “esprit de corps” of companies.287  Png 
suggested that employees always make tradeoffs between learning and 
receiving payments.288  Based on the theory of Fosfuri and Rønde, 
employee mobility is high if employees hold the technical information that 
is valuable to second-stage products.289  Scholars also observed that in the 
states without strong trade secret protection, companies increase salaries 
or hire relatives for retaining employees.290 
 
V. Balance the Enforcement of Contracts and Trade Secret 
Law 
 
According to the nexus between information management and 
innovation in the use and enforcement of contracts and trade secret law,291 
courts should find the balance between reducing the disclosure risks 
resulted from employee mobility or betrayal and promoting innovation 
invested by companies and conducted by employees or outsiders.  When 
courts and legislators support the legal security measures adopted by 
companies, courts should foresee both a probable decrease in innovation 
and the decreased knowledge spillovers for the strong exclusive rights 
given to companies under contract law or trade secret law.  This Article 
argues that courts should narrowly enforce NDAs as consistent as the 
scope of trade secret law but broaden the scope of trade secret protection 
without a harm on employee loyalty.  It is more efficient for innovation to 
strengthen trade secret protection by adopting the IDD than enforcing 
CNCs. 
 
A. Non-Disclosure Agreements 
 
285  Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90. 
286  See YEH, supra note 18; Bhattacharya & Guriev, supra note 35; 
Trajtenberg & Shalem, supra note 103. 
287  Levine & Sichelman, supra note 27, at 768 (“[T]here is no doubt that 
trade secrecy can serve such a purpose and thus help promote the esprit de 
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NDAs may not effectively reduce the disclosure risks borne by a 
company because not all confidential information (i.e., P2 to P5) is 
protectable under NDAs.292  Under ineffective NDAs, the disclosure risks 
borne by the company and the legal risks of its employees are both high.  
As Epstein & Levi reminded, while NDAs can deter information 
disclosure by employees, NDAs can never be perfectly competent to 
indicate and cover every unit of confidential information.293  The high dual 
risks suggest high security costs for the company and harm the company’s 
innovation, incentives of employees to improve their KSE, and social 
innovation. 
Courts can reject enforcement of NDAs or narrowly enforce 
NDAs for encouraging knowledge spillovers and social innovation.  
Instead, courts can enforce NDAs for protecting enforceable trade 
secrets.294  Denials of NDAs are a utilitarian process for accumulating 
knowledge spillovers.  First, denials of NDAs filter out social deadweight 
losses due to the information’s inefficient use by its owners from all the 
confidential information (i.e., P2 to P5).  Second, denials of NDAs allow 
efficient use of the filtered information under competition. 
 
B. Trade Secret Law 
 
The ineffectiveness of NDAs in trade secret protection can be 
fixed by trade secret law.295  Courts do not enjoin a company from 
enforcing NDAs for trade secrets.296  Moreover, inadequate NDAs that do 
not thoroughly cover each unit of unpublished or confidential information, 
but establish implicit fiduciary duties, may trigger the liability for trade 
secret misappropriations.  The trade secret information disclosed by bad 
faith employees who self-learn the information is enforceable under trade 
secret law.297 
The strengthened protection under the UTSA and the DTSA 
suggests an increase of security costs, which does not necessarily suggest 
legal inefficiency.  Statistics showed that NDAs are necessary but not 
 
292  Sandeen, supra note 155, at 143 (suggesting that it is arguable about 
whether or not confidential agreements are binding). 
293  Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 900. 
294  See, e.g., Sandeen, supra note 155, at 143. 
295  See id. at 132 (suggesting the use of trade secrets to define the 
boundary of confidential relationships). 
296  Id. at 126–27. 
297  See Lemley, supra note 28, at 318 (suggesting that the obligation of 
trade secret protection is set either explicit by contracts or implicit by duty). 
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sufficient to establish the element of reasonable efforts in federal courts,298 
while it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing 
trade secrets according to the UTSA.299  The company also needs other 
physical security measures to show reasonable efforts for protecting 
confidential technical information (i.e., P2 to P5) as trade secrets, while the 
security does not need to be perfect.300  These physical security measures 
do not strictly prohibit employees from accessing the information, but 
allow them to use the information due to the legal protection.  The 
information’s economic value should offset security costs for the company 
but required by law, so trade secret protection is still efficient for the 
company.  Otherwise, the company pursues patents for protecting the 
information, or disposes it in the public domain.301 
Trade secret law supplementing NDAs, however, shrinks the 
scope of information protection.  Confidential technical information 
addressed in NDAs (i.e., P2 to P5) may not be entitled to trade secret 
protection for lack of novelty or independent economic value.  For 
example, confidential information readily ascertainable to the public is not 
novel and not entitled to trade secret protection in some states other than 
California.302  Broad trade secret protection, such as the CUTSA and the 
IDD, narrows the gap between the scope of trade secret law-protectable 
information and the scope of confidential technical information (i.e., P2 to 
P5).  Broad trade secret protection fixes some ineffective or unenforceable 
NDAs, and strong trade secret law can reduce the company’s disclosure 
losses and disclosure risks.  As a result, broad trade secret law and strong 
trade secret protection function as rewards for the company to train 
employees and may further improve the company’s R&D investment.303 
It is reasonable that most scholars support the relief of novelty 
requirements for trade secret protection.304  Without communicating the 
 
298  Almeling et al., supra note 214, at 294. 
299  See Risch, supra note 72; Sandeen, supra note 155, at 140; Johnson, 
supra note 195, at 566. 
300  See Lemley, supra note 28, at 325. 
301  See generally Schmidt, supra note 26. 
302  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2012); ABBA Rubber Co. v. 
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 528–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
303  Compare Lemley, supra note 28, at 313 (arguing that trade secret 
protection encourages information disclosure to employees), with Bone, supra 
note 21, at 271 (expressing doubt about how trade secret law can promote 
information disclosure). 
304  See e.g., Pamela Passman et al., Economic Impact of Trade Secret 
Theft: A Framework for Companies to Safeguard Trade Secrets and Mitigate 
Potential Threats, CTR. RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE & TRADE (2014).  See also 
Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A 
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 
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confidential information to outsiders, the company has difficulties in 
evaluating both the novelty and the economic value of its unpublished 
technical information. R&D activities conducted within the company form 
the information.305  If the company is less confident on the long-term value 
of the information—especially the information potentially being used in 
production (i.e., P2 and P3)—the company is more likely to disclose the 
information in a patent application (i.e., P1 or D).306  Then, the security 
costs for the company are reduced, and the public benefits from the 
knowledge spillovers.  This argument about the novelty requirement in 
trade secret law supplements the literature about IP strategies for 
protecting innovative information under patents or trade secrets.307 
Companies that try to enforce trade secrets unevenly understand 
that innovation is a process of exchanging information in Phase I and 
Phase II, and between insiders and outsiders.308  Myopic companies are 
conditioned to exchange information in employee training (i.e., Phase I 
transaction) by trade secret protection,309 but ignore Phase II transactions 
and the benefits of knowledge spillovers that are contributed by outsiders. 
Economists criticized the mixed use of NDAs and trade secrets for 
the public interest.310  NDAs are ex ante without knowing the information 
value, which may not fairly compensate inventor employees.311  However, 
trade secret law protecting innovative and valuable information does not 
give the employees a second chance to renegotiate with companies.312  
Weak negotiation powers on the side of employees discourage Phase II 
information transactions and expand information asymmetries.313  The 
literature also reminds the risks that strong trade secret law (e.g., the IDD) 
may harm competition.314  For example, companies may abuse it to sue 
 
73 (1999). 
305  See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 142 (suggesting that economic value 
of the information may not be defined in a short term but instead varies by the 
user of the information). 
306  See Schmidt, supra note 26, at 3, 7 (arguing for the publishment of 
technical information for free). 
307  See, e.g., Michael R. McGurk & Jia W. Lu, The Intersection of Patents 
and Trade Secrets, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 189, 205 (2015) (comparing 
between trade secrets or patents strategically). 
308  See Ritala et al., supra note 78, at 22. 
309  See id. 
310  See Anton & Yao, supra note 84, at 203. 
311  See id. 
312  See id. 
313  See id. at 192. 
314  See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 154 (citing the IP theory discussed by 
Justice Scalia).  See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 
205, 214 (2000) (discussing the possibility of over-protection for intellectual 
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departing employees to restrain competitions with startups rather than 
repair harms caused by trade secret misappropriations.315 
Relatively inessential, some scholars encourage courts to shrink 
the scope of trade secret protection further for protecting employees.  For 
example, Hrdy suggested that courts should enforce or reject trade secrets 
by an employee-oriented measure that the KSE of talented employees are 
not treated as trade secrets.316  She inherited Turner’s suggestion that 
personal KSE are not trade secrets, regardless of their value and secrecy 
status.317  Giving property rights of the information or knowledge that 
employees know of, but is invested by companies to employees, only 
increases the transaction costs in Phase I and induces Phase II knowledge 
transactions.318  Renegotiations between companies and employees may 
not be activated if employees hold property rights.  Recall the failure of 
Locke’s labor theory in this utilitarian IP world.319  The key in determining 
trade secret scope by courts is not to assign property rights of technical 
information to employees or companies but rather to allocate the efficient 
deployer of the information between the companies and outsiders (e.g., 
competitors or spin-out start-ups).  With a presumption of the freedom of 
employment, enforcing trade secrets is a balance between the deadweight 
losses and marginal gains for companies and the marginal costs of 
duplicate innovation for outsiders that departing employees join.320  
Outsiders may deploy the information more efficiently than the companies 
originating the information (e.g., P4 or P5).  Lemley relied on the Arrow’s 
information paradox and suggested this possibility.321  He also suggested 
that eliminating the secrets that exist only for legal protection can reduce 
social costs.322  Moreover, he reminded courts that trade secret owners 
might not be first movers but only have the possibility of becoming first 
 
property rights). 
315  See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).  See 
also Bone, supra note 21, at 279. 
316  See Hrdy, supra note 201, at 2463–64. 
317  See id. at 2449.  See also AMEDEE E. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE 
SECRETS 115–72 (1962). 
318  See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089 (1972). 
319  See generally LOCKE, supra note 82.  But see Lemley, supra note 28 
(categorizing trade secrets as IP rights); Gordon, supra note 83, at 1608 
(criticizing Locke’s theory and the interests of individuals in innovation). 
320  See Risch, supra note 72, at 38 (arguing that there are marginal costs 
for outsiders when departing employees cannot use the information under 
trade secret protection). 
321  See Lemley, supra note 28, at 339 n.119. 
322  See id. at 336. 
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movers.323  Fisher and Oberholzer-Gee also suggested policymakers to 
incumbent innovation followers for encouraging them to invent around 
existing technologies.324 
Therefore, it is an exaggeration for scholars to equalize the 
function of the IDD and CNCs.325  The core of applying the IDD is to 
protect trade secrets rather than employee stability, regardless of whether 
the freedom of employment may be conflicted with trade secret protection.  
If trade secret misappropriations after employee mobility create 
irreparable harm, courts may learn from the injunction rules for patents in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C326 and carefully adopt the IDD.327  
While injunctive relief means little to patent owners as a form of 
remedies,328 without a public entity issuing formal property rights to trade 
secret owners,329 injunctions for trade secret owners do not function more 
than confirming their property rights over the information, which may 
facilitate licensing the information by outsiders.330 
Being lavish in adopting the IDD and granting injunctions 
suggests excessive first-mover advantages, which harms competition and 
small businesses and may result in market inefficiency.331  Some empirical 
evidence suggests that while implementing the IDD does not increase 
employee mobility and knowledge spillovers, the rules against the IDD 
result in a higher level of expert mobility and knowledge spillovers.332  
 
323  See id. at 340 n.122. 
324  William W. Fisher III & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management 
of Intellectual Property: An Integrated Approach, 55 CAL. MGMT. REV. 157, 177 
(2013). 
325  The appendix suggests that many states do not consistently adopt the 
IDD and enforce CNCs.  See Godfrey, supra note 231, at 167 (combining the 
analyses of the IDD and CNCs).  Cf. Patio Enclosures, Inc. v. Herbst, 39 F. 
App’x. 964, 969 (6th Cir. 2002). 
326  547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
327  The ex parte seizure remedy under the DTSA has a similar effect, 
suggested by Lobel.  See Lobel, supra note 149, at 374. 
328  Gene Quinn & Eileen McDermott, The Year in Patents: The Top 10 
Patent Stories of 2019, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Dec. 29, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/12/29/year-patents-top-10-patent-stories-
2019/id=117177/ (commenting that giving more injunctive relief functions as 
restating the patent issuance and is not what patentees expect). 
329  See generally Hall et al., supra note 16 (distinguishing formal IP and 
informal IP). 
330  See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 318. 
331  See Sandeen, supra note 155, at 154 (criticizing over-protection for 
trade secrets).  See also Lobel, supra note 149, at 377–78. 
332  I.P.L. Png & Sampsa Samila, Trade Secrets Law and 
Engineer/Scientist Mobility: Evidence from “Inevitable Disclosure” (Feb. 2013), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=7892A0D935B1417F
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Some empirical evidence suggests that the IDD harms innovation 
quality.333  Therefore, California is a moderate model of trade secret 
protection.  On the one hand, it broadens the scope of trade secret 
protection ex ante by protecting “readily ascertainable” information.334  
On the other hand, it has a high ex post bar of enforcing the broad trade 
secret by broadly not adopting the IDD but asking for actual harm.335 
Least importantly in terms of innovation efficiency, Hyde in the 
late 1990’s suggested that courts should compensate company reputations 
under trade secret law rather than their trade secret damages,336 which was 
criticized by Gilson for lack of efficiency.337  Preliminary injunctions may 
function as reputational compensations in the U.S., suggested by how 
copyright infringers are sued for protecting privacy,338 and also expected 
by trade secret owners.339  However, companies are encouraged to receive 
such reputational compensations from the patent regime, which is a filing, 
examination, and registration system.340 
 
C. Covenants Not to Compete 
 
Enforcing CNCs can be understood as a reward to a company for 
training and investing in employees for improving their inventiveness and 
KSE.  Enforcing a CNC suggests low security costs for preventing 
information disclosure to a company’s competitors, especially the 
information being used in production (i.e., P2).341  Moreover, employee 
stability also ensures the success of developing second-generation 
 
3A3C4E0ECA9D0FA6?doi=10.1.1.308.5620&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
333  See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2924. 
334  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2016); ABBA Rubber Co. v. 
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 519 (Ct. App.1991). 
335  E.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002). 
336  See Alan Hyde, Real Human Capital: The Economics and Law of 
Shared Knowledge 137–40 (May 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
N.Y.U. L. REV.); Gilson, supra note 41, at 601 (citing Hyde’s suggestion). 
337  See Gilson, supra note 41, at 624. 
338  See generally Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH. 
L. REV. 1019 (2019).  
339  See McGurk & Lu, supra note 307, at 205. 
340  See Quinn & McDermott, supra note 328 (suggesting that preliminary 
injunctions have limited benefits for patent owners since giving a preliminary 
injunction is not more than repeating the USPTO’s issuance). 
341  See Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 583 (calling CNCs as a 
surplus for employers because of preventing employees spin-out to maximize 
their benefits). 
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products.342  By contrast, Fosfuri and Ronde suggested that the valuable 
information that can be applied in second-generation products (i.e., P3) 
spurs employee mobility, knowledge spillovers, and competition.343  In 
addition, the protected information includes both the information known 
to the company and the asymmetric information that is only held by 
employees but can be used to compete with the company (e.g., H1).  
Overall, the loss from disclosing unpublished information under CNCs can 
be as low as the loss under trade secret law, which requires higher security 
costs compared to CNCs.  The CNC substitute for costly trade secret law 
is supported by empirical evidence that where CNCs are strongly enforced, 
trade secret law is not frequently claimed against employees/employers.344 
CNCs are, however, inefficient when companies are uncertain 
about their entitlement of the rewards, or courts are not clear about who 
should be entitled to the rewards.  On the side of companies, even though 
the legislation does not strictly prohibit CNCs, some states usually do not 
enforce CNCs, such as California.345  Moreover, the enforceable CNC 
protection of information is limited to a short period, particular 
geographical areas, the type of information, and the receivers of the 
disclosed information.  In other words, only CNCs fail to secure both the 
information and the revenue generated by the information and cannot 
reduce disclosure risks borne by the companies.  A probable grievous 
outcome of using CNCs is that innovation within companies is worsened 
when employees lack the incentives and abilities to create valuable 
technical information.346  CNCs increase the costs of employees to find 
jobs, and reduce the incentives of employees to learn and acquire technical 
information from companies.347  The legal risks of breaches of CNCs 
restrict employee mobility.348  However, the legal risks do not create 
incentives for employees to transfer their knowledge to employers.  Thus, 
CNCs cannot eliminate asymmetry information only held by employees 
(i.e., L, H1, and H2). 
 
342  Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 46. 
343  Id. at 47–48. 
344  See Png, supra note 25, at 4. 
345  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. REG. § 16600 (West 1941); CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 2802 (West 2016); Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen Inc., No. 2:17-00715, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13548, at *12–13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018). 
346  Compare Png, supra note 25, at 8–9 (suggesting that CNCs reduce 
innovation and entrepreneurship), with Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 90, 
at 5 (arguing no causal relationships between CNCs and innovation and the 
employee turnover). 
347  See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2929–31. 
348  See Gilson, supra note 41, at 606 (suggesting that CNCs reduce 
employee mobility but do not improve innovation). 
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On the side of courts and legislators, the culture of strengthening 
CNC enforcement does not benefit the public interest.  Creating a culture 
of anti-spillovers by CNCs prevents companies from acquiring the 
benefits of spillovers from others.  This culture can also be interpreted as 
a culture of over-rewarding companies, especially large businesses, which 
decreases competition in the market.  Companies extend their market 
power by CNCs rather than high-tech products, which have a relatively 
short life span.349  The rewards are not free, but the rewards reduce profits 
received from continued innovation.350  Companies, including the 
rewarded large businesses, cannot hire leading employees from leading 
companies to produce more technical information in that culture.351  
Empirical evidence shows that the states with strong CNC enforcement on 
average have lower employee mobility but more low-wage employees and 
higher recruitment costs compared to other states.352  Moreover, the 
comparison between Silicon Valley and Route 128 suggests that CNCs are 
inefficient in promoting innovation in the industry of cumulative 
technologies.353  Prohibiting employers from using CNCs is one 
significant characteristic of Silicon Valley,354 even though no literature 
supports the causal effect of this prohibition on the success of Silicon 
Valley.  Risch noted that companies can only rely on CNCs when the law 
is not clear about the scope of trade secrets, while the uncertainties of 
enforcing CNCs increase the costs in Phase I transactions.355 
Moreover, CNCs may result in reverse-selection and only 
unenthusiastic employees are retained.356  An innovative departing 
employee following his CNC may bring the knowledge to other cities or 
industries.  As a result, the knowledge may spill to other cities or 
industries, which may not efficiently benefit the development of domestic 
innovation but benefit the society in general.  Therefore, as Fosfuri and 
Rønde suggested, when enforcing CNCs, courts should not treat it as an 
 
349  See id. at 613 (explaining that CNCs in Massachusetts have provided 
“critical additional protection . . . because trade secret protection of tacit 
knowledge is ineffective”). 
350  See Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 47; Franco & Mitchell, supra 
note 60, at 586. 
351  See Franco & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 586. 
352  Evan Starr et al., Mobility Constraint Externalities, 30 ORG. SCI. 961, 
962 (2019). 
353  See Gilson, supra note 41, at 629. 
354  See id. (suggesting courts and policymakers not blindly replicate or 
follow the legal model of Silicon Valley but adopt CNCs depending on their 
domestic demands and industry characteristics). 
355  Risch, supra note 72, at 41. 
356  See Contigiani et al., supra note 30, at 2923. 
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independent contract issue but rather should take the local labor market 
and market competition into consideration.357  Otherwise, enforcing CNCs 
suggests over-rewards and harms R&D incentives and public interests.358  
Therefore, it is not surprising that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
moved against CNCs and proposed rules to limit the use of them.359 
 
D. Employee Loyalty 
 
Under the legal risks shifted by companies, it is still possible that 
employees may develop their knowledge unknown to the company (i.e., 
H1, and H2) with outsiders or in spin-out startups.  Then, while the valuable 
information may not be a deadweight loss to the society (i.e., L), it is still 
a deadweight loss to the company.  It is not clear whether or not outsiders 
can deploy the information more efficiently than the company.  In other 
words, the use of the information by a company other than the previous 
employer may or may not be efficient. 
It could be more efficient for the previous company to decide the 
value of the asymmetric information held only by employees.  Otherwise, 
its early-stage investment in the information would never be collected 
from outsiders or spin-out startups.  The company may appreciate the 
innovativeness of the contributors and invest in the information inside the 
company or fund it in a subsidiary (spinoffs).  However, the company 
cannot force employees to utterly reveal their ideas, which form valuable 
technical information.  Loyal employees may be more active in revealing 
their valuable or innovative ideas to the company, suggesting a lower 
degree of asymmetric information only held by employees (i.e., L, H1, and 
H2). 
Even though it is an old story to improve employee loyalty 
through management measures,360 it is controversial how courts treat 
employee loyalty in trade secret cases.  Strong concerns about employee 
loyalty or confidential relationships lead courts to enforce fiduciary duty 
without a shell of trade secrets.361  Alternatively, the strong property-right 
 
357  See Fosfuri & Ronde, supra note 31, at 60. 
358  See id. 
359  Braden Campbell, Noncompete Developments to Watch for in 2020, 
LAW360 (Jan. 14, 2020 10:55 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1234422/noncompete-developments-to-
watch-for-in-2020-. 
360  See Epstein & Levi, supra note 70, at 900–02 (suggesting that the use 
of leadership or morale can improve employee loyalty). 
361  See, e.g., Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 
559 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009); NovelAire Techs., LLC v. Harrison, 2009-1372 (La. 
App. 4 Cir. 10/13/10), 50 So. 3d 913.  See also Graves & Tippett, supra note 
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theory may substitute confidential relationships and lead courts to affirm 
the property rights of companies over any information developed under 
their investment and sources.362  However, the idea of assigning strong 
property rights to trade secret owners has been criticized by scholars.363  
In practice, the property-right theory is primarily adopted to solve patent 
issues364 or criminal trade secret claims,365 but rarely adopted in civil trade 
secret cases.366  In other words, courts adopt broad property rights for trade 
secret owners and criminal sanctions against employees under the 
Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) to deter both trade secret thefts and the 
decrease in employee loyalty.367  The question remains for future studies 
on how the EEA can deter bad faith information disclosure or improve 
employee loyalty.  The bottom line for civil trade secret law is not to 
discourage employee loyalty for creating moral-hazard crises.368 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret law are ineffective to protect 
unpublished technical information due to legal uncertainties and 
information asymmetries between companies and employees.  The 
 
197, at 88–89. 
362  See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior U. v. Roche Molecular 
Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).  See also Lobel, supra note 168, at 814. 
363  See, e.g., Sandeen & Levine, supra note 25, at 366 (suggesting the law 
adopts liability rule rather than property rule); Risch, supra note 72, at 27. 
364  E.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior U., 563 U.S. at 786 
(“[U]nless there is an agreement to the contrary, an employer does not have 
rights in an invention ‘which is the original conception of the employee alone.’” 
(quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 189 (1933)); 
Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
365  See, e.g., People v. Aleynikov, 104 N.E.3d 687 (N.Y. 2018) (setting 
boundaries between public domain and the company properties). 
366  See, e.g., Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 73843 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017); Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. 
Avant! Corp., 57 P.3d 647, 650 (Cal. 2002) (“California does not treat trade 
secrets as if they were property.”); Hrdy, supra note 201, at 2411–13 
(introducing the trial process of the Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc.); Risch, 
supra note 72, at 24–25. 
367  See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R42681, STEALING 
TRADE SECRETS AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC 
ESPIONAGE ACT (Aug. 19, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42681.pdf 
(explaining the EEA mechanism); Lobel, supra note 168, at 802–03 (suggesting 
that the scope of the EEA definition of trade secrets is broader than the UTSA). 
368  But see generally Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 180 (proposing 
applying copyright similarity standards for the determination of trade secret 
misappropriations, which ignores the importance of employee loyalty and may 
induce more moral-hazard issues). 
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information asymmetries, which result in moral-hazard issues, decrease 
innovation efficiency.  When enforcing CNCs, NDAs, and trade secret 
law, courts need to balance between promoting innovation incentives and 
over-rewarding first-mover advantages.  NDAs need to be narrowly 
enforced but supplemented by trade secret law or CNCs.  However, CNCs 
are less efficient than trade secret law in terms of promoting innovation.  
Contracts and trade secret law cannot eliminate but may aggravate the 
information asymmetries, which need to be alleviated by improving 
employee loyalty under internal management and the law that does not 
harm employee loyalty.  
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Appendix 
 
State USTA CNC IDD/Actual or Threatened 
Misappropriation 
Arizona Yes Yes. 
See Gann v. Morris, 596 
P.2d 43 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1979). 
Not clear/decided. 
Arkansas Yes No. 
See Bendinger v. 
Marshalltown Trowel 
Co., 994 S.W.2d 468 
(Ark. 1999). 
IDD. 
See Bendinger v. 
Marshalltown Trowel Co., 
994 S.W.2d 468 (Ark. 
1999). 
Californi
a 
Yes No. 
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE §§ 16600–17365 
(West 2020). 
Actual harm & no IDD. 
See Whyte v. Schlage Lock 
Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
Colorado Yes No. 
See Saturn Sys., Inc. v. 
Militare, 252 P.3d 516 
(Colo. App. 2011). 
Not clear/decided. 
Connecti
cut 
Yes Yes. 
See Aetna Ret. Servs. v. 
Hug, No. CV 
970479974S, 1997 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 1781 
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 
18, 1997). 
IDD. 
See Aetna Ret. Servs. v. 
Hug, No. CV 970479974S, 
1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1781 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 
18, 1997). 
Delaware Yes Yes. 
See W.L. Gore & 
Assocs. v. Wu, C.A. No. 
263-N, 2006 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 65 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
30, 2006). 
IDD. 
See E. I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co. v. Am. 
Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 
A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964). 
Florida Yes No, but plausibly 
applicable. 
See Fountain v. Hudson 
Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 
So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1960). 
Threatened harm. 
See Del Monte Fresh 
Produce Co. v. Dole Food 
Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 
1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
Georgia Yes Yes, but limited 
applicability to key 
employees. 
See GA. CODE. ANN. 
§ 13-8-50 (2020); Blair 
v. Pantera Enters., Inc., 
IDD. 
See Essex Grp., Inc. v. 
Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 
501 (Ga. 1998). 
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824 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2019). 
Illinois Yes No. 
See 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 90/10 (2017). 
IDD. 
See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
1065/3(a) (2009); PepsiCo, 
Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 
1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
Indiana Yes No. 
See 
Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. 
Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind. 
1998). 
IDD, 
See Ackerman v. Kimball 
Int’l, Inc., 652 N.E. 2d 507 
(Ind. 1995). 
Iowa Yes Yes. 
See Lamp v. Am. 
Prosthetics, Inc., 379 
N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 
1986). 
IDD. 
See Barilla Am., Inc. v. 
Wright, No. 4-02-CV-
90267, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12773 (S. D. Iowa 
July 5, 2002). 
Kansas Yes Yes. 
See Idbeis v. Wichita 
Surgical Specialists, 
P.A., 112 P.3d 81 (Kan. 
2005). 
IDD. 
See Bradbury Co., Inc. v. 
Teissier-duCros, 413 F. 
Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan. 
2006). 
Kentuck
y 
Yes Yes. 
See Charles T. Creech, 
Inc. v. Brown, 433 
S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014). 
Actual harm & no IDD. 
See Invesco Inst. (N.A.), 
Inc. v. Johnson, 500 F. 
Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ky. 
2007). 
Louisian
a 
Yes No. 
See LA. STATE. ANN. 
§ 23:921 (2015). 
IDD. 
See LA. STATE. ANN. 
§ 51:1432 (1981). 
Marylan
d 
Yes Yes, but not favored. 
See Millward v. 
Gerstung Int’l Sport 
Educ., Inc., 302 A.2d 14 
(Md. 1973); 
Ecology Servs. v. Clym 
Envtl. Servs., LLC, 952 
A.2d 999 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2008). 
Actual harm & no IDD. 
See LeJeune v. Coin 
Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 
451 (Md. 2004). 
Massach
usetts 
Yes Yes. 
See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 149, § 24L 
(West 2018); 
IDD. 
See ArchiText, Inc. v. 
Kikuchi, No. 90572, 2005 
Mass. Super. LEXIS 487 
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Boulanger v. Dunkin’ 
Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 
572 (Mass. 2004). 
(Sup. Ct. Mass. May 19, 
2005). 
Michigan Yes Yes, but not favored. 
See MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 445.774a (West 
2020); 
Huron Tech. Corp. v. 
Sparling, No. 316133, 
2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 
1675 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Sept. 11, 2014). 
IDD. 
See MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 445.1903 (West 
1998). 
Minnesot
a 
Yes Yes. 
See La Calhene, Inc. v. 
Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 
523 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
IDD. 
See La Calhene, Inc. v. 
Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523 
(W.D. Wis. 1996). 
Missouri Yes Yes. 
See Healthcare Servs. 
Ozarks, Inc. v. Copeland, 
198 S.W.3d 604 (Mo. 
2006). 
IDD in legislation. 
See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 417.455.1. 
But no IDDs recognized in 
courts. 
See Panera, LLC v. Nettles, 
No. 4:16-cv-1191, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101473 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016). 
Nevada Yes No. 
See NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 613.330 (2017). 
No IDD. 
See Ginkgo v. V., No. 
CV16-01869, 2016 Nev. 
Dist. LEXIS 3183 (Nev. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2016). 
New 
Hampshi
re 
Yes No. 
See N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 275:70 (2014). 
Threatened harm & no IDD. 
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 350-B:2 (1990); Allot 
Commc’ns., Ltd. v. Cullen, 
No. 10-E-0016, 2010 N.H. 
Super. LEXIS 11 (N.H. 
Superior Ct. Feb. 2, 2010). 
New 
Jersey 
Yes Yes. 
See Nat’l Starch & 
Chem. Corp. v. Parker 
Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 
31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1987). 
IDD. 
See Nat’l Starch & Chem. 
Corp. v. Parker Chem. 
Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
New 
Mexico 
Yes Yes. 
See Bowen v. Carlsbad 
Ins. & Real Estate Inc., 
Not clear/decided. 
See Insure N.M., LLC v. 
McGonigle, 995 P.2d 1053 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2000). 
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724 P.2d 223 (N.M. 
1986). 
New 
York 
No Yes, but not favored. 
See BDO Seidman v. 
Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 
1220 (N.Y. 1999); 
Sutherland Glob. Servs., 
Inc. v Stuewe, 902 
N.Y.S.2d272 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2010). 
IDD. 
See Spinal Dimensions, Inc. 
v. Chepenuk, No. 4805–07, 
2007 WL 2296503 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2007). 
North 
Carolina 
Close Yes. 
See N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 75-4 (2005). 
IDD. 
See Travenol Labs., Inc. v. 
Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1976). 
Ohio Yes Yes. 
See P & G v. Stoneham, 
747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2000). 
IDD. 
See P & G v. Stoneham, 747 
N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2000). 
Oregon Yes Yes, but can be voidable. 
See OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 653.295 (2020). 
Yes. 
See OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 653.295 (2020). 
Pennsylv
ania 
Yes Yes. 
See Pittsburgh Logistics 
Sys., Inc. v. BeeMac 
Trucking, LLC, 202 
A.3d 801 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2019). 
IDD. 
See 12 PA. STAT. AND. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5302–
03 (West 2004). 
Texas Yes Yes. 
See TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE § 15.50 (West 
2009). 
Actual harm & no IDD. 
See Cardinal Health Staffing 
Network. Inc. v. Bowen, 
106 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App. 
2003). 
Utah Yes Yes. 
See TruGreen Cos., 
L.L.C. v. Mower Bros., 
Inc., 199 P.3d 929 (Utah 
2008). 
Threatened harm. 
See CDC Restoration & 
Constr., LC v. Tradesmen 
Contractors., LLC, 274 P.3d 
317 (Utah Ct. App. 2016). 
Vermont Yes Yes, but not favorable. 
See Dicks v. Jensen, 768 
A.2d 1279 (Vt. 2001). 
Not clear/decided. 
See Davison v. 
Caleidoscope Commc’n. 
Co., No. S0436-04, 2004 Vt. 
Super. LEXIS 88 (Vt. Nov. 
8, 2004). 
Virginia Yes Yes. Threatened harm & no IDD. 
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See Assurance Data, Inc. 
v. Malyevac, 747 S.E.2d 
804 (Va. 2013). 
See Motion Control Sys., 
Inc. v. East., 546 S.E.2d 424 
(Va. 2001). 
Washingt
on 
Yes Yes. 
See Sheppard v. 
Blackstock Lumber Co., 
540 P.2d 1373 (Wash. 
1975). 
IDD. 
See Moore v. Commercial 
Aircraft Interiors, LLC, 278 
P.3d 197 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2012). 
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